The Supreme Court 1997 Term -- Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation by Dorf, Michael C.
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
11-1-1998
The Supreme Court 1997 Term -- Foreword: The
Limits of Socratic Deliberation
Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law School, michaeldorf@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History, Theory and
Process Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dorf, Michael C., "The Supreme Court 1997 Term -- Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation" (1998). Cornell Law Faculty
Publications. Paper 99.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/99
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
at Tue Nov 25 20:58:25 2008
Citation:  112 Harv. L. Rev.  1998-1999
From the HeinOnline License Agreement:
Licensees are granted a personal, non-exclusive,  non-transferable, limited license
to access the on-line, electronic archive of journals and other materials provided
by HeinOnline (the 'Database'), and to download or print any portion or portions of
content of the Database ('Materials'), primarily for your own use, according to the 
terms of this Agreement. This license includes: 
(a) The right to electronically display Materials retrieved from the Database on your
    computer terminal;
(b) The right to download Materials by means of the download commands of the HeinOnline
    website and to store a single copy of Materials in a machine-readable form on your
    computer; and
(c) The right to print Materials by means of the printing commands of the HeinOnline 
    website and to create a single print of Materials downloaded by means of the 
    downloading commands of the HeinOnline website.
Except as specifically provided above, you are prohibited from downloading, storing,
reproducing,transmitting, displaying, copying, distributing, or using any portion of the 
Database. Without limiting the preceding sentence, you shall not download or print an 
entire issue or issues of a publication or journal within the Database. You may contact
HeinOnline by telephone or in writing in order to obtain a printed copy of one or more 
entire issues of such a publication or journal subject to payment of any applicable charge.
Other terms apply to this subscription.  See the complete license at heinonline.org.
THE SUPREME COURT
1997 TERM
FOREWORD: THE LIMITS OF SOCRATIC
DELIBERATION
Michael C. Dorf*
When the Justices divide over interpretive methodology, they usually do so along a fault
line between textualists and purposivists. The Court's textualists aim to discover the
original public meaning of federal statutes and the Constitution, while purposivists treat
authoritative text as a starting point for the inference of legislative purposes that can be
applied to concrete questions not expressly addressed by the text. Because textualism as
practiced by its proponents on the Court is backward-looking, it is particularly ill-suited
to the problems of a rapidly changing world to which the Court must constantly apply
statutory and constitutional text. In principle, purposivism ought to be more dynamic,
but in practice, purposivism ana textualism share limitations that may be associated
with the common law method of case-by-case development: like the Socratic method, the
common law method as traditionally practiced exhibits a preference for speculation over
experimentation. Increased reliance on social science would likely have only a small
impact on the Court's work because of the judiciary's limited ability to gather and digest
social science data. To better effect would be doctrines that channel learning by other
political and social actors. Relying on a starkly instrumental conception of federalism
and implementing other reforms, the Court could construct a model of "provisional
adjudication," in which it worried less about finding the "true" meaning of authoritative
texts - whether by textualist, purposivist, or common law methods - and instead
focused on finding provisional, workable solutions to the complex and rapidly changing
legal problems of our age.
D uring the final week of the 1997 Term, the Supreme Court invali-
dated the Line Item Veto Act,1 upheld a requirement that the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts consider "standards of decency" in its
awards,2 declared that HIV infection is a disability under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act,3 and issued three rulings on the contentious
issue of sexual harassment.4 This flurry of activity gave the impres-
* Vice-Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. For their insightful
comments and suggestions, I am very grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Vincent Blasi, Eric Bravin,
Richard Briffault, Sherry Colb, Christopher Eisgruber, Richard Fallon, George Fletcher, Barry
Friedman, Gerard Lynch, John Manning, Henry Monaghan, Trevor Morrison, Gerald Neuman,
Charles Sabel, William Sage, Frederick Schauer, Allan Stein, Peter Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Laur-
ence Tribe, Anne Voigts, Jeremy Waldron, and Benjamin Zipursky, as well as the participants in
the Columbia Law School Public Law Lunch and the Michigan Law School Legal Theory Work-
shop. Research assistance was skillfully and cheerfully provided by Charles Honig and Joel
Taylor.
I See Clinton v. City of New York, ii8 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (998).
2 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, I18 S. Ct. 2168, 2171-72 (1998).
3 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998).
4 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2280 (1998) (holding "that an employer
is vicariously liable for actionable [sexual harassment] caused by a supervisor, but subject to an
4
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sion of a Court at the center of the nation's most pressing controver-
sies. This impression is largely false - an artifact of a Court schedule
that typically leaves the most difficult or divisive cases for last. For
most of the 1997 Term, fundamental questions of liberty and equality
were almost invisible.5 Even matters of federalism, so prominent in
recent Terms, receded from view. Instead, the docket was crammed
with technical questions of "lawyer's law." Such issues are an essential
ingredient of every Term's caseload, but this year they were especially
dominant, as the Court turned its attention to filling relatively small
gaps in acts of Congress and the Court's own precedents.
The relative quiescence of the 1997 Term provides an opportunity
to consider the interpretive issues the Court faces in its routine cases
no less than in its momentous ones; although the Term produced few
major substantive battles,6 there were a number of interesting meth-
odological skirmishes. Given the docket's composition, the principal
disagreements concerned how to read statutes. How dispositive is
statutory text? Should the Court attempt to discern the intent of the
Congress that enacted a statute, and if so, using what tools? Is the
meaning of a statute fixed at its adoption or does it evolve?
affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of a
plaintiff victim"); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2261 (i998) (same); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., i8 S. Ct. i989, i993 (i998) (holding that a school district is not liable un-
der Title IX for sexual harassment of a student by a teacher absent actual notice to, and deliber-
ate indifference by, the school authorities). Earlier in the Term, the Court decided a fourth sexual
harassment case. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (r998)
(holding that Title VII does not bar same-sex sexual harassment claims).
5 One of the most interesting cases on the Court's docket when the Term began was dis-
missed upon the parties' request. See Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, xi8 S. Ct.
595 (i997), cert. granted sub. nom Piscataway Ed. of Educ. v. Taxman, X17 S. Ct. 25o6 (i997), and
cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (i997). The case involved the use of race as a tie-breaker in em-
ployee layoffs. See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3 d 1547, 1549 (3d Cir. 1996).
6 As in the previous Term, see Washington v. Glucksberg, i 7 S. Ct. 2258 (i997), the sharpest
disagreement of the 1997 Term occurred in a case in which the Justices were unanimous about
the result. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, i8 S. Ct. 1708 (i998), the Court held "that
high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not
give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983."
Id. at 172o. En route to that unanimous conclusion, the Court invoked the "shocks-the-
conscience" test derived from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. i65 (1952). Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at I717.
This was too much for Justice Scalia to stomach. He wrote separately to decry what he saw as
the Court's abandonment of the "objective" approach to substantive due process that he believed
had been endorsed in the previous Term's decision in Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268. See Lewis,
i8 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority
fired back, contending that the shocks-the-conscience standard is a threshold for the statement of
a claim that executive action violates substantive due process. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1717 &
n.8. In addition, Justice Kennedy explained that the seemingly subjective shocks-the-conscience
test marks the beginning of an inquiry into objective, albeit evolving, traditions. See id. at 1722-
23 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring). Unlike Glucksberg, in which the Court's
unanimous result masked serious disagreements about how future cases should be handled, Lewis
was a strange case to provoke debate over judicial subjectivity, because the shocks-the-conscience
standard seemed to be no more than an intermediate step in a decision that, far from granting
courts discretion, announced a per se rule.
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When the Justices divided over questions such as these, they usu-
ally did so along a fault line between purposivists and textualists. Ac-
knowledging that legislation cannot be drafted to anticipate every
eventuality, purposivists treat authoritative text as a starting point for
the inference of reasonable legislative purposes that can be applied to
concrete questions not expressly addressed by the text. Fearing that
purposivism allows too much room for subjective value judgments by
unelected, unaccountable judges, the Court's textualists aim to dis-
cover and apply the original public meaning of federal statutes and the
Constitution. 7
However, just as the rush of "big" cases at the end of the Term
provides a misleading picture of the substance of the Court's work-
load, the debate between purposivists and textualists that appears
throughout Volume i18 of the Supreme Court Reporter provides a
misleading picture of the Court's methodologies. The differences be-
tween purposivists and textualists are not nearly so sharp as the dispu-
tants often claim. Purposivists sometimes write opinions that could
have been written by textualists,8 and (somewhat less frequently) vice-
versa.9 Overall, the Court is eclectic in the sources to which it turns
7 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3,
I6-i8, 37-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
8 For example, Justices Breyer and Souter appear to be the leaders of the purposivist camp.
Yet the former's opinion for the Court in Muscarello v. United States, Ii8 S. Ct. i911 (1998), was
devoted to discerning the plain meaning of the expression "carries a firearm," as used in i8 U S.C.
§ 924(c)(i). Only after resolving the case on textual grounds did the opinion consider congres-
sional intent, "the statute's basic purpose," and "its legislative history." Muscarello, I 18 S. Ct. at
1915-19. Similarly, Justice Souter's opinion for the unanimous Court in Geissal v. Moore Medi-
cal Corp., I18 S. Ct. 1869 (1998), consisted almost entirely of a close parsing of the text of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985; the Court rejected the respondent's
proposed reading principally because it "will not square with the text." Id. at 1874; see also For-
ney v. Apfel, 1 i8 S. Ct. 1984, 1986 (1998) (Breyer, J., for a unanimous Court) (holding that a dis-
trict court decision remanding a social security claim to the Social Security Administration for
further proceedings was an appealable final decision because 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) "means what it
says").
9 Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 18 S. Ct. 1904 (1998), is arguably
an example of a purposivist opinion written by a Justice with strong textualist leanings. In that
case, Justice Thomas's opinion for a unanimous Court found an "unmistakably clear" congres-
sional intent to permit state and local taxation of freely alienable Indian land by inquiring what
purpose would be reasonable to attribute to Congress. Id. at i909; see also AT&T v. Central
Office Tel., Inc., iI8 S. Ct. 1956, 1963 (1998) (Scalia, J., for the Court) ("If discrimination in
charges does not include non-price features, then the carrier could defeat the broad purpose of the
statute by the simple expedient of providing an additional benefit at no additional charge." (em-
phasis added) (quoting Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 998 F.2d io58, io62 (D.C. Cir.
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bryan v. United States, ii8 S. Ct. 1939, I95I (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority approach leads to "strange results," and suggest-
ing an alternative congressional purpose).
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for guidance in both statutory o and constitutional 1 cases. More fun-
damentally, the textualism-versus-purposivism debate masks the de-
gree to which the Justices all proceed from the same methodological
starting point: textualists and purposivists alike respect precedent, and
for this reason, the Court's interpretation of statutory and constitu-
tional provisions has strong affinities with the common law method in
which courts reason by analogy to develop legal principles on a case-
by-case basis.
Therefore, any cogent description of Supreme Court jurisprudence
must include an account of the common law method. In the leading
such account, Holmes claimed that the common law's genius is its
adaptability; as social circumstances change, common law doctrines
gradually change with them. 12  Indeed, this very flexibility leads for-
malists to worry that judges who use the common law method will
subordinate authoritative text to their own subjective normative
views.13 Thus, both friends and foes of the common law method see it
as a dynamic process.
This Foreword challenges the conventional wisdom that the com-
mon law method - as traditionally understood and as currently prac-
10 Any number of examples could be adduced. I choose one almost at random. In Caron v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 2007 (1998), the Court stated, in textualist fashion: "While we do not
dispute the common sense of [the] approach [urged by the petitioner], the words of the statute do
not permit it." Id. at 2011. Just three paragraphs later, the Court stated, now in purposivist
fashion, that "petitioner's approach yields results contrary to a likely, and rational, congressional
policy." Id. at 2012.
11 For example, Justice Souter's opinion for the Court in United States v. Balsys, ii8 S. Ct
2218 (r998), invoked arguments based on constitutional text, the Framers' understanding, histori-
cal practice, the Court's precedents, the overriding purpose of the Bill of Rights, and policy con-
siderations to conclude that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not
protect a witness who fears only foreign prosecution. See id. at 2222-36. See generally Michael
C. Doff, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. LJ. 1765, 1787-96 (1997) (discussing eclecticism in constitutional adjudication
and arguing that any method of constitutional interpretation that derives its legitimacy from a
variety of sources will inevitably point in conflicting directions). Note also that the methodologies
adopted by the Justices are not always predictable. In Clinton v. City of New York, r18 S. Ct.
2091 (1998), for example, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto
Act on the ground that "[tihere is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to
enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes." Id. at 2103. Joining this textualist - or even formalist -
opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Jus-
tices Scalia and Breyer (each joined in part by the other and by Justice O'Connor) wrote separate
opinions that mixed textualist and purposivist arguments, treating the Line Item Veto Act as the
functional equivalent of a permissible delegation to the President. See id. at 2,15-18 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2120-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Who could have
predicted this lineup based on jurisprudential, political, or any other factors?
12 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1-38 (Little Brown & Co. 199o)
(i88i).
13 See Scalia, supra note 7, at 17-18 (worrying that "under the guise or even the self-delusion
of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own ob-
jectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory
field").
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ticed by the Supreme Court -- provides adequate means for adjusting
legal doctrine to accommodate changed circumstances. It argues that
in a world of rapidly accelerating technological and social change,
common law gradualism is an increasingly ineffective means of legal
evolution. Common law gradualism does not enable the Court to learn
from experience in any systematic fashion. The Court typically treats
prior cases much like classroom hypothetical examples, which are use-
ful for provoking intuitions but not especially informative about the
operation of legal norms in the real world.
These shortcomings of the traditional common law method com-
pound problems caused by institutional constraints generally under-
stood to be rooted in Article III. The Justices live and work in relative
isolation from major currents of American political, technological, and
social life.14 Their principal sounding boards, their law clerks, do little
to broaden the Justices' skills or perspectives: clerks have almost no
practical experience as lawyers, much less as policymakers, and are
drawn from the same legal culture as the Justices themselves.
The Court's isolation thus intensifies the same dilemmas that in-
creasingly face the other branches of the national government. No in-
stitution of the central government - the Court, Congress, the Execu-
tive, or a centralized administrative bureaucracy - can effectively
superintend the detailed application of the general norms it or some
other institution propounds. But the extent of the Court's institutional
and methodological limitations poses special problems.
What can the Court do to overcome its limited ability to adjust its
doctrines to the rapidly changing world? Explicitly paying greater at-
tention to the likely consequences of its decisions and to the empirical
assumptions underlying its doctrines would be a step in the right direc-
tion,'5 because even if one believes that courts are meant to be fora of
principle rather than policy,l6 any sound account of the role of courts
should make real-world experience relevant to adjudication. However,
we should not expect too much from a conscious judicial adoption of
bureaucratic fact-finding and regulatory methods: even administrative
agencies increasingly find that they cannot formulate regulations that
adequately respond to diverse and rapidly changing social circum-
14 This is not a new observation. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term -
Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes - Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 8I
(i96o) ("In our situation and tradition, the Supreme Court is inevitably an isolated and remote
body.").
15 Thus, Judge Posner argues that the Court should make greater conscious use of social sci-
ence research. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 11-12
('998).
16 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69 (1985) (distinguishing principle from
policy).
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stances, and thus the most innovative forms of regulation depart from
the model of the centralized problem solver exercising expertise. 17
Ameliorative reforms - if not cures - are available. For example,
the Court's recent preoccupation with federalism' 8 could be turned to
effective use were the Court to treat federalism as a flexible principle
that allows decentralized experimentation, rather than as a doctrine
focused primarily on the "dignity" of states. 19 By relying on this
starkly instrumental conception of federalism and implementing other
reforms, the Court could construct a model of provisional adjudica-
tion. It would worry less about finding the "true" meaning of authori-
tative texts,20 and instead - while sensitive to its own institutional
limitations - would focus on finding provisional, workable solutions
to the complex and rapidly changing legal problems of our age.21
The Foreword proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the conflict
between textualism and purposivism. Although the textualism-versus-
purposivism debate has less significance than the disputants believe, it
is hardly irrelevant. To the extent that important jurisprudential ques-
tions will, in the short run, continue to be framed within the terms of
this debate, I would cast my lot with the purposivists. As espoused by
its proponents on the Court, textualism is a form of originalism.22 It is
17 See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (x998) (describing an emerging shift toward democratic ex-
perimentalism and decentralization).
18 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 ('997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 ('995).
19 This would require a shift in the dominant understanding of federalism. See Michael C.
Dorf, Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Federalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 825 (i998); Dorf & Sabel,
supra note 17, at 419-38; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, z995 Term - Comment:
The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", iio HARV. L. REV. 102, 132 (i996).
20 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLum. L. REV.
133, 146-52 (1997) (arguing that Ronald Dworkin's hypothesis that right answers exist in hard
cases is irrelevant to the work of the courts because there are no objective measures of legal
truth).
21 Richard Fallon's Foreword of a year ago provides a useful point of comparison and con-
trast. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term - Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, i HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997). I agree with Fallon that "[i]dentifing the 'meaning'
of the Constitution is not the Court's only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to imple-
ment the Constitution successfully." Id. at 57. (1 would also include interpretation of federal
statutes in this mission.) Fallon approves of the use of detailed doctrinal tests that subordinate
individual Justices' normative views, on the ground that doctrine promotes stability. Thus, ex-
cept in extraordinary cases, he favors fairly strong adherence to stare decisis, even in constitu-
tional law. See id. at io6-26. I am more skeptical of the power of doctrinal tests to determine
outcomes than Fallon appears to be. I also see detailed doctrine as an effort at the sort of cen-
tralized decisionmaking that the accelerating pace of technological and social change in recent
decades has destabilized in private and public administration. See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra
note 17 (discussing democratic experimentalism and decentralization). Thus, among other differ-
ences between Fallon's view and my own, I would prefer to see stare decisis play a less important
role in the Court's work than Fallon would.
22 If originalism connotes deference to the subjective views of the enactors of statutory or con-
stitutional text, then it clearly differs from textualism. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of
Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, io84-88
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backward-looking 23 and, for that reason, particularly ill-suited to the
problems of a rapidly changing world to which the Court must con-
stantly apply statutory and constitutional text. In contrast, in its reli-
ance on principles that leave the decisionmaker greater room to ma-
neuver in subsequent cases, purposivism's advantages over textualism
mirror the advantages of standards over rules.24 I am thus mildly en-
couraged that during the 1997 Term, the purposivists won most of the
battles in which interpretive methodology appeared to make a differ-
ence.
25
Part II moves beyond the textualism-versus-purposivism debate by
noting the ubiquity of the common law method in the Court's work.
The Part explains the limitations of the traditional common law
method by exploring its connections with the Socratic method, which
in turn exhibits the preference for speculation over experimentation
found in the philosophy of Plato. Of course, I do not claim that judges
who employ the common law method are unwitting Platonists. In-
stead, I contend that the connection to Plato stems from the style of
thought that dominated law school education when the current Jus-
tices were trained, and that, in substantial measure, continues to
epitomize "thinking like a lawyer."
Part III locates building blocks for a model of provisional adjudica-
tion in some of the Court's existing doctrines and practices. I argue,
among other things, that the Court ought to give greater deference to
state policies that arguably infringe constitutional rights than to
equivalent uniform national policies infringing such rights;26 permit
some doctrinal disagreements among the lower courts to go unresolved
in order to discern the practical consequences of different legal re-
(1992). Originalism, however, can connote original meaning rather than original intent, and I use
the term in the former sense.
23 In characterizing originalism (and the form of textualism endorsed by Justice Scalia) as
backward-looking, I do not deny that originalist arguments are often invoked as a means of
breaking with established precedent. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. I (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 25-29, on file with the Har-
vard Law School Library) (describing the practices of the Warren Court). However, the persua-
siveness of originalist arguments usually rests on their ability to connect a given principle of law
with the past rather than with the present or future.
24 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 199i Term - Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, lo6 HARv. L. REV. 22, 57-69 (1992). The textualist would undoubtedly
reply that by constraining judicial discretion, textualism's advantages over purposivism mirror
the advantages of rules over standards.
25 The victory may, of course, prove ephemeral. It was, after all, only a few years ago that the
textualists appeared to have the upper hand, see Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of
Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 436-47 (1995), and they may yet regain it.
26 See infra pp. 62-65.
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gimes;27 and treat more of its precedents as provisional than is for-
mally permitted under the doctrine of stare decisis.28
Before coming to the details of my critical and constructive proj-
ects, I must consider a threshold objection and avert a potential confu-
sion. First, the objection: one might complain that a critique of the
Court's methods for being insufficiently plastic mistakenly assumes
that adjudicatory flexibility is an unalloyed virtue. On the contrary,
the objection continues, to further predictability, stability, evenhand-
edness, and the range of other values traditionally associated with the
rule of law29 typically requires inflexibility as a limit on arbitrary deci-
sionmaking, so that what I identify in this Foreword as a weakness of
textualism and (to a somewhat lesser extent) all of the Court's interpre-
tive methods is actually a strength. To use ancient categories, there is
a tradeoff between law and equity.30
My response to this objection challenges its premise. Formalists as-
sert that their method better honors the rule-of-law side of the tradeoff
than do more dynamic methods.31 However, in constitutional interpre-
tation, that claim has been repeatedly challenged on the ground that
originalism (which is typically defended in formalist terms) does not
deliver on its own promise.32 Instead of substituting objective criteria
external to the decisionmaker for judicial subjectivity, formalism
merely disguises the role of subjective value choice.33 Textualism,
originalism, and other brands of formalism do not trade flexibility for
27 See infra pp. 65-66.
28 See infra p. 73.
29 See Richard H. Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
CoLUm. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1997).
30 See Allen Dillard Boyer, "Understanding, Authority, and Will": Sir Edward Coke and the
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REv. 43, 72-80 (x997); John P. Dawson, Coke
and Ellesmere Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in x6r6, 36 ILL. L. REv. Nw. U. r27, 146-
52 (1941); David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 170o, 61 IND. L.J. 539,
573-83 (1986).
31 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1i75
(1989).
32 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION io6
(199I); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
i9 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 2, 4 (i985) (describing originalism as "arrogance cloaked as humility';
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 221-31
(rg8o); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 65, 74-
33 Moreover, the Court's self-described originalists lack the courage of their convictions. For
example, Justices Scalia and Thomas are both deeply committed to the notion that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause commands "color-blindness." See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 239 (i995) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring). Yet they make no seri-
ous effort to derive that principle from the original understanding of the Clause, nor do they con-
front the substantial body of evidence indicating that in i868, equal protection was generally un-
derstood to be consistent with government assistance programs granting benefits on expressly
racial grounds. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 430-33 (1997); Eric
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA.
L. REv. 753, 754-83 (i985); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-
Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 477, 556--65 (i998).
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predictability, but for the false promise of predictability. To put the
point provocatively, all methods of interpretation are dynamic, 34 if for
no other reason than that there is no such thing as "adhering" to an old
meaning in a new context. 35
This response to the formalist's objection points the way to the
heart of my argument about the limitations of the common law
method of case-by-case legal evolution elaborated in Part II: the choice
is not one between stasis and dynamism, but between different kinds
of dynamism. Here, a parallel from the private sector may prove illu-
minating. In the old world, firms could expect to recoup investments
in single-purpose machinery and large inventories over the course of
long product cycles; in the emerging world, the race is to the flexible.3 6
So too in law. In the old world - already fast vanishing by the turn
of the last century if not much earlier - it seemed as though legal
norms could emerge gradually out of generations of experience with
their operation under relatively fixed social conditions. In the modern
(not to mention postmodern) world, courts must apply seemingly fixed
legal principles to contexts that change radically within a decade.
Perhaps this phenomenon is a relatively new one, or perhaps it is just
that we have only recently become aware of the problem, but in either
case, we cannot put the genie back in the bottle.
Consider an important case from the last year, albeit not one de-
cided by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Microsoft,3 7 the D.C.
Circuit overturned a preliminary injunction prohibiting Microsoft from
requiring computer manufacturers that install its operating system,
Windows 95, also to install its Internet browser, Explorer. The court
was guided by the view that judges should not "embark on product
design assessment. '38  Although one could argue that the court was
overly solicitous of Microsoft's contention that the operating system
and browser constitute an integrated product, 39 the court's attitude
was wholly understandable, given the tendency of computer technol-
ogy to evolve more rapidly than legal doctrine formulated in the con-
ventional way.
34 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-47 (1994).
35 See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 395, 398 (1995) (noting that originalists routinely acknowledge that changed facts justify
applying the same text in new ways).
36 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 292-314.
37 147 F.3 d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
39 Id. at 949.
39 For example, the court accepted as evidence of integration the fact that "the operating sys-
tem[']s use [of] the browser's HTML reader ... provide[s] a richer view of information on the
computer's hard drive." Id. at 952. If such trivial enhancements are all that is required for two
products to be considered integrated, firms can easily evade the antitrust laws by building such
features into otherwise distinct products.
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Now I come to the potential confusion. The D.C. Circuit's re-
sponse to the Microsoft litigation was a judicial retreat. My sympathy
for this approach should not be confused with a general endorsement
of the "passive virtues."40 Arguments for judicial minimalism often
find roots in the longstanding obsession of constitutional law and
scholarship with what Alexander Bickel termed the "countermajori-
tarian difficulty."4 1 Bickel's objection sounded in the legitimacy of ju-
dicial review, but whether the concern is legitimacy or, as is more typi-
cally true in statutory cases, expertise,4 2 the standard prescription is
deference to decisions reached by the more accountable, better in-
formed, elected branches.43
In its prescriptive mode, this Foreword does not follow the Bicke-
lian pattern. Although some of the doctrines I commend under the ru-
bric of provisional adjudication would result in less judicial decision-
making, I do not contend that judicial passivity is always a virtue.
For example, in discussing the Court's resolution of the sexual harass-
ment cases, I argue that the Court missed an opportunity to use its
bully pulpit to articulate a broad moral vision.44 A Bickelian could
fairly disdain this and other of my prescriptions as unduly "activist,"
although I would argue that the term should not necessarily carry a
pejorative connotation.
In any event, the principal goal of this Foreword is diagnosis rather
than prescription. The proposals sketched below in Part HII - and
they are only sketched, not elaborated in detail - serve to check the
overly negative tendencies of any primarily descriptive and critical
project.4s Further, my prescriptions serve only to ameliorate. The
40 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, zg6o Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARv. L. REV. 40,40 (g6I).
41 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). The obsession with the countermajoritarian difficulty is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998)
("The 'countermajoritarian difficulty' has been the central obsession of modern constitutional
scholarship.").
42 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984).
43 Cass Sunstein has lately championed a Bickelian revival. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 175-78 (z996) (advocating rules of interpretation
designed to minimize the risks of judicial discretion and promote judicial restraint); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, io8 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1751-54 (1995) (stating that
"a prime purpose of the rule of law is to rule off limits certain deep ideas of the right or the
good"); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, Y995 Term - Foreword: Leaving Things Unde-
cided, io HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996) (arguing that judicial minimalism appropriately allocates
power in a democracy).
44 See infra p. 78.
45 Perhaps such prescriptions are not entirely obligatory. See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossi-
ble: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLum. L. REv. 2255, 2332 (1997)
("There can be no conclusion if one means by that a recommendation of a policy or recipe for ac-
tion superior to those I have critiqued.").
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common law method that I identify in Part II as lying at the heart of
the Court's approach to adjudication has extraordinarily deep roots in
Anglo-American legal thought. Even if the Court were inclined to tear
up those roots, it would be reckless to do so without some under-
standing of how the new regime would fit within the overall scheme of
American government.
I have elsewhere explored the partial emergence of one such
scheme and outlined the new roles the Court could play in it.46 Here,
in contrast, I provide an account of the methods the Court uses to play
its current role. I shall come soon enough to the limitations shared by
the competing methodologies the Justices employ, but first, we should
do the Justices the honor of taking seriously the differences that they
believe divide them.
I. TEXTUALISM VERSUS PURPOSIVISM
This Part describes the leading interpretive approaches expressly
articulated by the Justices of the Supreme Court. As Part II explains
in greater detail, the differences between the philosophies described in
this Part - textualism and purposivism - mask the degree to which
the Justices all proceed from similar assumptions. But this is not to
say that the terms in which the Justices discuss their methodological
differences are unimportant. At the very least, the textualism-versus-
purposivism debate provides a window into what the Justices believe
to be their points of disagreement, and thereby reveals the unspoken
assumptions they all share.
The approach of this Part is primarily descriptive. Where it turns
critical, textualism is the main target. I contend that, as practiced by
the Supreme Court, textualism in statutory interpretation is a close
relative of originalism in constitutional interpretation, and shares its
main defects. 47
46 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 388-404, 459-64.
47 In addressing statutory and constitutional interpretation together here and throughout this
Foreword, I do not mean to suggest that there are no salient differences between these two enter-
prises. One might think that because our Constitution is written in broad terms and designed to
endure for generations, greater flexibility is warranted in interpreting it than in interpreting stat-
utes aimed at relatively narrow problems. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
407 (1819); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 90-92 (1991). Alternatively,
one might think that because an erroneous interpretation of a statute can be "corrected" by the
democratic process more readily than an erroneous constitutional interpretation can be, the Court
should be more willing to give expansive interpretations to statutory text than to constitutional
limits. (Proponents of this view could also cite McCulloch, emphasizing that the Court's flexible
approach there was one that allowed Congress broad interpretive latitude.) Finally, not all consti-
tutional provisions speak in majestic generalities, see J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Can-
ons of Constitutional Law, i i HARV. L. REV. 963, 995 (1998) (noting that the canonical counter-
example is the requirement that the President be at least thirty-five years old), nor do all statutes
set forth detailed, technical requirements, see, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (i994) ("Every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
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A. Defining Textualism and Purposivism
The term "textualism" implies that there is an alternative approach
to statutory interpretation that does not much concern itself with
statutory text. The chief candidate for such an approach is exempli-
fied by the 1892 decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States,48 in which the Court stated that an act that falls within the
general language of a statutory prohibition may nonetheless be consid-
ered outside the statute's coverage if the contrary result would be ab-
surd.49 However, a method of interpretation that defines itself in op-
position to Holy Trinity is grossly underdetermined; the case has not
been cited favorably in a majority opinion of the Court in nearly a
decade,50 and even in the most recent case to cite it, the Court relied
on a legislative purpose derived in significant part from the text of the
statute itself.5 '
If textualism cannot be defined as the antithesis of Holy Trinity,
how should it be defined? Justice Scalia, the Court's leading textual-
ist, would contrast textualism with intentionalism, the view that sees
statutory interpretation as a quest for the legislature's intent.5 2  But
the rejection of subjective legislative intent as the ultimate goal of
statutory interpretation - like the rejection of Holy Trinity - dra-
matically under-specifies the attitude of textualists because jurispru-
dents of many stripes reject intentionalism.5 3 In recent memory, the
best-known sustained attack on the quest for subjective legislative in-
tent is Ronald Dworkin's argument in Law's Empire.5 4 Dworkin ar-
gues that even if one begins (naively, in his view) with the belief that
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."); Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994) (requiring that Federal Communications Commission
licensing decisions serve the "public interest"). I do not deny the importance of these distinctions,
nor do I contend that they somehow cancel each other out. I invoke constitutional interpretation
because it provides a familiar reference point for the debate over statutory interpretation, and
because there are important resonances between the Supreme Court's methods of constitutional
and statutory interpretation.
48 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
49 See id. at 459.
50 The last such citing was in Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,
453-54 (1989). Although the Court's opinion in Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091
(1998), does not cite Holy Trinity, part of its discussion of standing might be said to partake of
Holy Trinity's spirit. See id. at 2098 ("Acceptance of the Government's new-found reading of [a
statutory provision governing standing] 'would produce an absurd and unjust result which Con-
gress could not have intended.'" (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574
(1982))).
51 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 453.
52 See Scalia, supra note 7, at 16-17.
S3 See, e.g., Tribe, Comment, supra note 32, at 65 ("[W]e ought not to be inquiring (except per-
haps very peripherally) into the ideas, intentions, or expectations subjectively held by whatever
particular persons were, as a historical matter, involved in drafting, promulgating, or ratifying the
text in question.").
S4 See RONALD DWoRIUN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986).
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statutes simply mean what the legislature intended them to mean, dif-
ficulties inherent in ascribing intent to a multimember body on a ques-
tion it did not directly address will lead eventually to a quest for an
"objective" intent.s s At that. point the game is up, so that one might as
well admit that a judge must "construct, for each statute he is asked to
enforce, some justification that fits and flows through that statute and
is, if possible, consistent with other legislation in force. '5 6
In rejecting the quest for subjective legislative intent, textualists do
not follow Dworkin in asking "which combination of which principles
and policies, with which assignments of relative importance when
these compete, provides the best case for what the plain words of the
statute plainly require. '57  Textualists contend that, in practice, the
quest for the legislature's objective intent or purpose becomes the im-
position of the judge's subjective preferences.58  Textualists thus make
a straightforward appeal to notions of democracy.5 9 The Court's job is
to apply the law as enacted by the politically accountable bodies.
60
55 See id. at 317-33. For an earlier argument along these lines, see Max Radin, Statutory In-
terpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). See also Brest, supra note 32, at 2 16-22.
56 DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 338.
57 Id.
58 Justice Scalia states:
When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis
of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection between the two,
your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and
intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that
the law means what you think it ought to mean.
Scalia, supra note 7, at 18.
59 Public choice theory's depiction of the legislative process as one dominated by interest
group bargaining appears to be at the heart of the textualist's vision of democracy. Because stat-
utes invariably serve multiple, often conflicting purposes, public choice theorists claim that sin-
gling out a goal of one coalition of interest groups that supported the legislation as the purpose of
a statute is arbitrary. See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers Pension Fund, 916
F.2d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir. 199o) (Easterbrook, J.) ("We cannot divine the balance between objec-
tives by pointing to their existence."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory In-
terpretation as Practical Reasoning, 12 STAN. L. REV. 321, 335 (i99o) ("The complex compro-
mises endemic in the political process suggest that legislation is frequently a congeries of different
and sometimes conflicting purposes."). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,
5o U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (r983) (suggesting that the conventional assumption that statutes "an-
swer" questions posed by litigants is difficult to sustain); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use
of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994,
at 3. For measured critiques of public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEV, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 88-115 (1991), and JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW 8I-1o5 0097)-
60 See Scalia, supra note 7, at 9-14. From a historical perspective, there is considerable irony
in relying on democratic principles to reject purposivism in favor of textualism. It was precisely
those antidemocratic opponents of statutes in derogation of the common law who, in the early
part of this century, construed statutes narrowly, thereby defeating legislative objectives. See
Strauss, supra note 25, at 430-31. There is still further irony in Justice Scalia's invocation of civil
law interpretive methodology in support of his brand of textualism, see Scalia, "Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System," supra note 7 (emphasis added), because civil law jurisprudence
accords a large role to principles that transcend the enacted legal rules. See George P. Fletcher,
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For textualists in statutory interpretation, as for originalists in consti-
tutional interpretation, 6' this task entails applying the original public
meaning of the text in question.62
So much for defining textualism. What of purposivism? In defin-
ing purposivism, one might begin with the credo of the legal process
school: that, regardless of the actual workings of the legislature, it
should be presumed to comprise "reasonable persons pursuing reason-
able purposes reasonably."63 The purposivist judge aims to infer these
purposes and apply them. Beyond this goal, purposivism is somewhat
more difficult to define than textualism. Although Justice Scalia has
set forth the elements of his brand of textualism, no Justice has de-
clared himself or herself a purposivist or described that philosophy to
any extent. Most of the Justices tend not to be wedded to a single in-
terpretive philosophy, instead choosing more eclectically from a range
of methods.64 For example, their statutory opinions routinely refer to
Congress's intent,65 even though the Justices do not necessarily accept
the view that the goal of statutory interpretation is to recover subjec-
tive legislative intent.
Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 980-93 (ig8i) (noting that under the principle of
Rechtsanalogie, "several specific provisions [of the German Code] are taken to stand for a single
underlying principle" that is itself enforceable, and that German courts have recognized entire
lines of doctrine with no discernible roots in the Code); Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and
Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (explaining that the "prevailing method of in-
terpretation" of the French Code Civile "is purposive and dynamic" (quoting Letter from Peter
Lindseth, Associate Director, European Legal Studies Center, Columbia Law School, to Peter L.
Strauss, Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (Apr. 14, 1998))).
61 Of course, on the Court, these are the same people: Justices Scalia and Thomas.
62 See, e.g., -Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ... and Constitutions, 85 GEo. L.J. 1823,
1833-34 (1997). By referring to the "public" understanding of enacted text, textualists mean to
disown approaches that rely on the intentions of an elite group, such as the text's drafters. How-
ever, textualists accept that the "public" understanding may include terms of art or technical us-
age, if the publicly available material indicates that is how the text is best understood.
63 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); see also LON L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 8-io (1940) (discussing the
role of purpose in statutory interpretation for the legal process school); HART & SACKS, supra, at
148, 1374, 1377 (same). The leading figures of the legal process school were Felix Frankfurter,
Henry Hart, Alexander Bickel, Lon Fuller, Albert Sacks, Harry Wellington, and Herbert Wech:
sler. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 566-67
(1988). Some of its leading texts are HART & SACKS, cited above; Lon Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978); and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
64 See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1373 (1992) (offering five canons of statutory interpretation).
65 See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (1998) (Kennedy, J., for the Court);
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (1998) (O'Connor, J., for the Court);
Muscarello v. United States, it8 S. CL 1911, i919 (1998) (Breyer, J., for the Court); United States
v. Estate of Romani, x18 S. Ct. r478, 1488 (1998) (Stevens, J., for the Court); Beach v. Ocwen
Fed. Bank, 118 S. CL 14o8, 1413 (1998) (Souter, J., for the Court).
18 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:4
Semantics aside, the principal practical difference between textualists
on the one hand, and purposivists and eclectics on the other, concerns
the relevance of legislative history to statutory interpretation. When
statutory language is ambiguous, purposivists deem legislative history
relevant to ascertaining the general aims of Congress - the kinds of
problems at which they directed their enactment. 66 In contrast, textu-
alists deem most legislative history irrelevant to statutory interpreta-
tion. Accordingly, Justice Scalia refuses to author or join opinions re-
lying on legislative history on the ground that committee reports, floor
statements, and the like do not accurately reflect the view of Congress
and have not, in any event, gone through the formal process of adop-
tion prescribed by Article 1.67 This refusal can sometimes lead to
comical spectacles, as when a recent opinion was denominated as the
"opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 6," which Justice Scalia
declined to join because it cited legislative history.68
B. Difficulties with Textualism
Textualists' disdain for legislative history may seem to be in tension
with their claim to democratic legitimacy. Legislative history is a
source of guidance independent of the individual judge's beliefs, and
in cutting off access to it, the textualist judge increases the relative im-
66 Analogously, in constitutional interpretation, Jed Rubenfeld aptly refers to "paradigm cases"
of the mischief a provision was enacted to address. Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as
Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. iii9, 1169-71 0995).
67 See Scalia, supra note 7, at 29-37; see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 677 (997) ("[Tlextualists object to the use of legislative history
as an authoritative determinant of 'legislative intent."'). The textualist faith does, however, per-
mit citation of legislative history to show the context and background understanding of statutory
words or phrases at the time of their enactment. Thus, there was no dissent from Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion in Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997), which cited the views of the
Model Penal Code's drafters on the meaning of "conspiracy" as evidence of how that term was
widely understood in legal circles when it was included in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (I994). See Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 477. The same day
Salinas was decided, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy (an occasional textualist fellow trav-
eler) declined to join Part III of Justice Souter's otherwise unanimous opinion in Foster v. Love,
118 S. Ct. 464 (1997), because it inferred Congressional intent from the floor statement of the
sponsor of the Act in question. See id. at 468. The textualists' stance in Salinas is thus consistent
with their stance in Love because of the different uses to which legislative history was put in the
two cases.
68 National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., i18 S. Ct. 927, 930 (1998).
Justice Scalia even refuses to join portions of opinions that invoke legislative history disparag-
ingly. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956, 958 (1998)
(syllabus) (stating that opinion is "unanimous except insofar as Scalia, J., did not join Part II-C").
The portion of the opinion of the Court that Justice Scalia refused to join stated, "There is, finally,
nothing left of Milberg's position beyond an appeal to legislative history, some of which turns out
to ignore the question before us, and some of which may support Lexecon." Id. at 964. Some-
what less extreme is the view expressed by Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas) in Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 676 (I997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) ("I join all of the Court's opinion, except to the extent that it relies on ...
notably unhelpful legislative history ... ").
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portance of his own subjective views. For this and other reasons, the
claim that textualism provides a greater check on judicial subjectivity
than does intentionalism or purposivism - like the claim that origi-
nalism in constitutional interpretation is more determinate than rival
approaches - will strike many as highly dubious, 69 although I shall
not pursue those doubts here. Nor shall I devote more than a mar-
ginal comment to the observation that the textualist vision of democ-
racy as simple majoritarianism - perhaps rooted in public choice the-
ory - is not self-justifying in the way that textualists seem to think it
is.70 Students of constitutional law are familiar with an alternative
conception of democracy in which courts play a vital role as partners
with, rather than mere servants of, the legislature.7'
Putting such questions aside, my critique of Justice Scalia's textu-
alism focuses on the difficulty it has accommodating change. Before
elaborating on this argument, however, I should note that I focus on
textualism as espoused and practiced, rather than on some essential at-
tribute of a text-centered approach to statutory or constitutional inter-
pretation. Rejecting intentionalism and purposivism does not neces-
sarily require a backward-looking - that is, originalist - textualism.
One might instead emphasize statutory text over the legislature's spe-
cific intent and its objective purposes but permit that text to evolve
over time in a forward-looking manner. This approach, dubbed "dy-
namic statutory interpretation" by William Eskridge,7 2 is, on its face, a
69 See sources cited supra note 32. Moreover, textualism will often be in the eye of the be-
holder, as illustrated by Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (i998). In that case, Justice Stev-
ens, on behalf of the majority, rejected the argument that in order to defeat a summary judgment
motion, a prisoner bringing a constitutional claim that requires proof of a government official's
illicit motive must offer proof of such motive by clear and convincing evidence. After finding that
the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard was not justified by the Court's past qualified immu-
nity decisions, see id. at 1594-95, the Court added a textualist argument: "Neither the text of
§ 1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides any sup-
port for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs ... " Id. at 1595
. 
In
dissent, Justice Scalia did not deny this point, nor did he deny that the entire doctrine of qualified
immunity was a judicial creation. See id. at 1603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, he would
have justified an expansive interpretation of qualified immunity on the ground that the liability
scheme to which qualified immunity is a defense was itself originally a judicial creation - one
that was, in his view, unwarranted by the text or original understanding of § 1983. See id. at
1603 (criticizing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (i96i)).
70 Even if the public choice account of the legislative process as interest group bargaining is
descriptively accurate, it is hardly obvious that a theory of legislation should have any direct con-
sequences for a theory of how courts should interpret legislation. "After all, many have argued
that, in the interpretation of statutes, judges should proceed on the premise that Congress has en-
acted the legislation to foster the public interest and not simply to promote private interests."
Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Bureaucracy Seriously, 99 HARv. L. REV. 344, 354 (1985) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (I985)).
71 For an elaboration of this notion, which Ronald Dworkin terms "constitutional democracy,"
see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1-38 (1996).
72 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 34, at 5.
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plausible elaboration of textualism. 73 That the textualists currently on
the Court prefer a static approach may say more about them than
about inherent properties of textualism. 74
To illustrate the shortcomings of a backward-looking textualism,
consider two 1997 Term cases. In Brogan v. United States,75 the Court
confronted the question whether a suspect who falsely denies wrong-
doing when questioned by government agents, but who does so by
means of a simple, nondiscursive "no," violates 18 U.S.C. § rooi,
which prohibits making false statements to federal investigators. 76
73 Eskridge himself contrasts textualism (as well as intentionalism and purposivism) with his
own dynamic approach. See id. at 34-47; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 59, at 324-45; William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 690-91 (199o). However, in doing
so, Eskridge draws a contrast with textualism as actually preached and practiced by its propo-
nents rather than with inherent properties of textualism. See id. at 69o ("[T]he new textualism is
not nearly as dynamic as functionalist theories of statutory interpretation. But it demonstrates
that a 'conservative' formalist theory need not tie itself to the past.").
74 Other customary associations of positions among various jurisprudential debates may be
equally accidental. For example, my account of the textualism/purposivism debate will undoubt-
edly call to mind the related division of the Court into those Justices who favor formulating legal
norms as rules and those who favor standards. See Sullivan, supra note 24. See generally Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379-90 (1985) (distinguishing rules from
standards). Other things being equal, proponents of textualism tend to favor rules over standards,
while proponents of purposivism tend to prefer standards over rules. See Sullivan, supra note 24,
at 69-95. However, the axis dividing textualists from purposivists and the axis dividing those
who favor rules from those who favor standards are not linked as a matter of strict logic.
Consider, for example, a textualist approach to the Fourth Amendment, which, by its express
terms, does not require a warrant as a precondition to a search or seizure. The Fourth Amend-
ment's text merely recognizes a right against "unreasonable searches and seizures," and states that
if warrants do issue, they must be supported by probable cause, an oath, and particularity. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. Moreover, wearing an originalist hat, the textualist might contend that at the
time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, warrants were not generally required, but that if
a warrant was issued, it immunized the officer executing the warrant from civil liability. See Ak-
hil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 774 (I994). But see
Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U L. REV.
925, 930 (1997) (relying on William J. Cuddihy's unpublished doctoral dissertation to impeach
Amar's theories of the Fourth Amendment); George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Pro-
cedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. i819, 1829 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)) (same). Thus, a textu-
alistforiginalist could interpret the Fourth Amendment to require that the legality of searches and
seizures be measured by the general standard of reasonableness. See California v. Acevedo, 5o0
U.S. 565, 581-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
In contrast, a purposivist might argue that the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
control police power in the interest of protecting privacy. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Pri-
vacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1456, 1464 (1996).
Because of the reality that modern police work is an "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime," Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (948), the purposivist could claim that police on
the beat cannot be trusted to make their own judgments about what searches and seizures are
reasonable. Thus, the purposivist will depart from the literal text and the arguable original un-
derstanding of the Fourth Amendment to infer a rule that, absent some specific exception, the
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant as a precondition for a search or seizure. See id. at 13-14.
We see that textualism sometimes leads to standards, while purposivism sometimes leads to rules.
75 1r8 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
76 See id. at 8o8.
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The petitioner argued for an "exculpatory no" exception to the statute
because of the risk that law enforcement authorities would otherwise
question suspects about minor offenses in the hope that these suspects
would, understandably, initially deny wrongdoing and thus incur the
very serious penalties for violating the statute. 77 In addition, a viola-
tion of the statute occurs at the time the false statement is made,
thereby enabling prosecution of persons whose original misconduct
could not be reached because the statute of limitations had run.73 Be-
cause of these risks, a majority of the federal appeals courts had
adopted one or another form of the "exculpatory no" exception.7 9
The Brogan Court's rejection of the "exculpatory no" exception
proceeded in classic textualist fashion. Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia began by invoking Webster's Dictionary as support for the
proposition that saying "[tihe word 'no' in response to a question as-
suredly makes a 'statement,"' within the meaning of the statute.8 0 The
Court then placed an impossible burden on the defendant by posing
the question as whether "to depart from the literal text that Congress
has enacted."' For good measure, the Court added a functional ar-
gument - "making the existence of th[e] crime turn upon the credu-
lousness of the federal investigator (or the persuasiveness of the liar)
would be exceedingly strange"8 2 - but the Court's central line of
analysis turned on distinguishing legislative intent and purpose on the
one hand from statutory language on the other.8 3
Note how the majority's textualism in Brogan quickly moved from
a rejection of intentionalism and purposivism to a rejection of con-
scious dynamism. In an opinion (reluctantly) concurring in the judg-
ment, Justice Ginsburg noted that the risks of overzealous prosecution
under the statute had in fact been realized.8 4 The majority nonetheless
dismissed these concerns as a mere "supposed danger" from "hypo-
thetical prosecutors." s Of course, the majority could not deny that the
prosecutions cited by Justice Ginsburg had actually occurred, but for
the textualist-cum-originalist, the meaning of the statute is 'fixed at the
77 See id. at 8io.
78 See id. at 813 & n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
79 See id. at 812 & n.2.
80 Brogan, i8 S. Ct. at 8o8 (citing WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 2461 (2d
ed. i95o)).
81 Id. at 8o8.
82 Id. at 809.
83 See id. ('[]t is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified language of a stat-
ute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to remedy - even assuming that it is possible
to identify that evil from something other than the text of the statute itself.").
84 See id. at 812-13 & n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (listing cases illustrating
such abuses). Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Souter) nonetheless concurred in the result,
partly because she believed - perhaps too optimistically - that the Court's opinion left some
room for acquittals based upon the exculpatory no defense in extreme cases. See id. at 8,5-i6.
85 Brogan, I8 S. Ct. at 8io.
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time of its adoption. Thus, later experience is irrelevant to the stat-
ute's interpretation. Accordingly, actual horrors (if that is what they
are) were treated no differently from a hypothetical parade of horri-
bles. Brogan illustrates that, as practiced by the current Court, textu-
alism is a backward-looking interpretive approach to which real-world
experience is largely immaterial.
The Court's unanimous decision, again per Justice Scalia, in Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.8 6 also illustrates the limitations of
a backward-looking textualism. In that case, the Court reached the
sensible conclusion that Title VII erects no per se bar to claims of sex-
ual harassment in which the alleged harasser is of the same sex as the
alleged harassee . 7  However, the Court refused to articulate a norma-
tive vision of the evils the statute addresses. The Court merely re-
stated the requirement of the statute's text that to be actionable, har-
assment must constitute "discrimination 'because of ... sex,' "'8 and
urged lower court judges and juries to rely on "[c]ommon sense ...
and an appropriate sensitivity to social context"'89 to separate valid
from invalid claims.
Common sense and sensitivity to social context are indeed essential,
but absent some conception of what Title VII is about - some concep-
tion of "what's wrong with sexual harassment"90 - they are hardly
sufficient to distinguish between conduct that is and is not proscribed
by Title VII. Must the plaintiff show that the harasser treated men
and women differently? The Court suggested so,91 but offered no
elaboration or argument, despite a substantial controversy among
lower courts concerning immunity for so-called "equal-opportunity"
harassers, 92 not to mention feminist critiques of formal equality in a
86 ii8 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
87 See id. at ioo-o3.
88 Id. at iooI (quoting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a)(I)
(1994)) (omission in original).
89 Id. at 1003.
90 Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 69I (I997);
see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
91 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at ioo2 ("The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed." (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 5 10 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92 A number of cases approve the "equal opportunity" or "bisexual harasser" defense. See, e.g.,
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. i98i); Barnes v. Costle, 56i F.2d 983, 990 n.55
(D.C. Cir. 1977). But see McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3 d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996); Chiapuzio v.
BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) ("[T]he equal harassment of both
genders does not escape the purview of Title VII in the instant case."). The academic literature is
largely critical of such a defense. See, e.g., John J. Donahue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in As-
sessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 161o-II (1992); Franke, supra
note go, at 7 19-20; Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recogniz-
ing Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383 (1996). But see
Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment under Title
VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 70-78 (1995).
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variety of contexts. 93 Of what relevance, if any, is it that in a particu-
lar case the harassment reinforces sex-role stereotypes, a concern evi-
dent in the Court's sex discrimination cases under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause?9 4 If reinforcement of sex-role stereotypes is relevant,
what becomes of the position of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC') that Title VII does not proscribe discrimination
based on sexual orientation?95 Such discrimination usually reflects
disapproval of, among other things, homosexuals' defiance of the so-
cial requirement that men select women as mates and vice versa.9 6
The Oncale Court was probably wise not to attempt to give com-
prehensive answers to each of the above questions. Yet its determined
textualism prevented it from even identifying relevant considerations.
The Court declined to seek guidance from legislative intent 97 - which
would have been unhelpful in any event, as the Congress that enacted
Title VII was arguably not even concerned about male-on-female sex-
ual harassment, much less male-on-male harassment.98 Unable to find
93 See, e.g., MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 20-22 (i99 i ) (explaining that the ideal of formal equality does
not lead to substantive equality when men and women are differently situated); MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 19-23
(i99o ) (describing the "dilemma of difference" - how to take account of differences without stig-
matizing - as the product of a tendency in American law and culture to categorize people by sex,
race, and other traits).
94 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-26 (1982); see also Brief
of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs. (No. 96-568) (arguing that Title VII prohibits conduct that reinforces sex stereotypes in the
workplace).
95 See Brief for the United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at i6, On-
cole (No. 96-568) (citing EEOC Dec. 81-16 (Jan. i981), reprinted in EEOC Dec. (CCH Employ.
Prac. Guide) 6756, at 4796 (1983 ed.) [hereinafter EEOC Decision)).
96 1 say "usually" rather than "invariably" because discrimination against gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals could reflect moral disapproval of conduct in which such persons typically engage. See,
e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even in such cases, how-
ever, the moral disapproval is itself intertwined with the actor's defiance of sex stereotypes, be-
cause the conduct at issue need not be defined by reference to the sex of the actors. The discrimi-
nator decides to discriminate against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals rather than, say, all persons
who engage in sodomy, thus including the defiance of the sex stereotype in the definition of the
conduct. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (I994) ("[S]exual orientation, no matter
what causes it, acquires social and political meaning through the material and symbolic activities
of living people"); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, i88 n.2 (1986) (treating a facial challenge
to a general prohibition of sodomy as though it raised the issue of the constitutionality of a prohi-
bition on only homosexual sodomy). I do not insist on this point, however, because the EEOC
does not draw a status/conduct distinction; hence, there is no reason to explore that distinction
here. See Brief for the United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae, supra note 95, at 16 (citing
EEOC Decision, supra note 95, at 4796).
97 See Oncale, 1 r8 S. Ct. at 1002 (stating that "it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed").
98 See Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., joined by Scalia
and Starr, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (questioning whether Congress in-
tended to prohibit any sexual harassment under Title VII). Indeed, there is some evidence that
inclusion of a prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII was offered as an amendment by one
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an original public meaning that spoke at all to sexual harassment and
unwilling to construct an objective purpose for its prohibition, the
Court in its textualist mode could only fall back on the vague language
of the statute.
C. The Relative Influence of Textualism and Purposivism
The foregoing example of a unanimous textualist opinion does not
indicate that the Justices unanimously accept textualism. Thorough-
going textualism remains the hobbyhorse of Justice Scalia, with sup-
port from Justice Thomas. However, whereas Justice Scalia usually
dissents from opinions or parts of opinions that he considers inconsis-
tent with textualism regardless of the substantive outcome, the Court's
purposivists typically join textualist opinions if they agree with the
bottom line.99 Indeed, in an apparent effort to appeal to Justices
Scalia and Thomas, the purposivists sometimes write textualist opin-
ions.100 As a result, textualism has become an influential methodology
in statutory cases.
Nevertheless, in cases of actual conflict, purposivism more fre-
quently triumphs over textualism than vice-versa. This trend should
hardly be surprising, given purposivism's affinities with legal process
theory: most of the Justices attended law school during the heyday of
the legal process school, 1 1 and the experience no doubt shaped their
of Title VII's opponents, in the hope of killing the bill. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S.
Ct. 2257, 2271 n.i (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)). Of course, that circumstance no longer has much relevance, given Congress's appar-
ent ratification of the application of Title VII to sexual harassment. See Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2286 (1998) ("[T]he force of precedent here is enhanced by Congress's
amendment to the liability provisions of Title VII since the Meritor decision, without providing
any modification of our holding." (citing Civil Rights Act of igi § 102, 42 U.S.C. § i98ia
(1994)))
99 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 365 (1994). For a general account of the doctrinal complications that arise out of the
Court's status as a multimember body, see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpack-
ing the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986).
100 See supra note 8.
101 Five of the current Justices (Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) studied the le-
gal process Ur-text as law students at Harvard. See HART & SACKS, supra note 63, at cxxv; Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, z993 Term - Foreword. Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27 (1994) ('[T]he legal process school has quietly attained
what every Supreme Court litigator seeks: a majority on the Court."). Note that Eskridge and
Frickey count Justice Scalia in the legal process school's majority, although he appears to have
been less influenced by Hart and Sacks than the others. See generally George Kannar, The Con-
stitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1303-20 (199o) (examining the roots
of Justice Scalia's constitutional methodology). In terms of judicial temperament, we might sub-
stitute Justice O'Connor for Justice Scalia, notwithstanding the former's Stanford education.
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later views. 10 2 Thus, a majority of the Court happily engages in the
construction of objective legislative purpose that the textualists eschew.
Lewis v. United States 0 3 is an example of the typical legal process
approach to statutory interpretation. In that case, the Court held that
the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA)10 4 does not make Louisiana's first-
degree murder law applicable to the intentional killing of a young
child on a federal army base. 0 5 The Court could have readily derived
that result directly from the statute's text, 0 6 but the Court pointedly
avoided a "literal reading" of the statute, because doing so "would
dramatically separate the statute from its intended purpose,' 0 7 which
was to borrow "state law to fill gaps in the federal criminal law that
applies on federal enclaves."'10 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Tho-
mas, declined to join Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Lewis be-
cause of a methodological disagreement. 10 9 Objecting to the Court's
effort to further the statute's purpose, Justice Scalia contended that the
majority's approach "simply transform[s] the ACA into a mirror that
reflects the judge's assessment of whether assimilation of a particular
state law would be good federal policy."" 0
Justice Scalia undoubtedly meant this observation as an epithet.
Yet if the authoritative language under construction is ambiguous, as-
sessing whether a particular interpretation constitutes good federal
policy is both inevitable"' and consistent with the role of courts in a
constitutional democracy." 2 The crucial question then becomes how
courts should go about deciding what constitutes good federal policy,
102 Cf. Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and
Intellectual Inquiry, ii CONST. COMMENT. 463, 471 (1994-95) ("Many educators believe that
intellectual 'formations' are relatively firmly set in the earliest years of education, and that ap-
pears to be true of approaches people have to questions of legal analysis." (citing JEROME S.
BRUNER ET. AL, STUDIES IN COGNITIVE GROWTH (z966); JEROME S. BRUNER, A STUDY OF
THINKING (1956))).
103 118 S. Ct 1135 (1998).
104 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
105 See Lewis, 11S S. Ct. at 1145.
106 The ACA provides as follows:
Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave] is guilty of any act or omission which, al-
though not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if com-
mitted or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State ... in which such place is situated, by
the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense
and subject to a like punishment.
i8 U.S.C. § 13(a). The "act" in question (killing a child) was certainly "made punishable by any
enactment of Congress," to wit, a separate federal statute classifying the killing as second degree
murder. See 18 U.S.C. § iii1 (x994). Thus, one could argue, the Court did not need to look be-
yond the statute's text. See Lewis, I8 S. Ct. at 1139.
107 Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1139.
108 Id. (citing Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 718-i9 (1946)).
109 See id. at r145-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
110 Id. at 1147.
111 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 34, at 13-47-
112 See id. at IIi-4o.
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because with the exception of the caricatures of purposivists and evo-
lutionists that appear in the works of textualists/originalists, no one
advocates pure judicial subjectivity. In our legal system, judges typi-
cally turn to the common law method as the means of sorting out de-
sirable from undesirable policies. That method, and its limitations, are
the focus of the next Part.
II. THE UBIQUITY OF THE COMMON LAW METHOD -
AND ITS LIMITS
The preceding Part contrasted textualism/originalism with pur-
posivism and concluded that the backward-looking cast of the former
limits its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Purposivism
might suffer from the same infirmity if purposivists sought to imple-
ment the original purpose of a statute or constitutional provision. As
discussed, however, purposivism pays somewhat greater attention to
the likely future consequences of decisions, while textual-
ism/originalism often seems to celebrate its inattention to such mat-
ters. 113 Purposivism thus becomes somewhat dynamic in practice.
Indeed, it is precisely this dynamism that leads textualists to dis-
trust purposivism. For Justice Scalia, purposivism is indistinguishable
from the common law method of case-by-case development of the law,
in which judges assess the policy implications of various proposed
rules of law, constrained only loosely by analogies to prior cases. 114
However, the contrast between textualism on the one hand, and both
purposivism and the common law method on the other, seems forced.
Textualists and purposivists alike recognize a substantial role for
precedent in adjudication, and therefore share a commitment to the
common law method. Thus, even though textualists officially de-
nounce common law methodology as another subjective approach, that
methodology pervades all of the Court's work.' 1
From the perspective of one concerned about the Court's ability to
adjust doctrine to changing circumstances, it would appear that the
pervasiveness of the common law method in Supreme Court adjudica-
tion should be celebrated. After all, the common law method is cer-
113 Compare Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, i18 S. Ct. 1618, 162 1-22 (1998) (holding that a pris-
oner who files a habeas petition containing a claim that had previously been dismissed without
prejudice as premature should not be treated as filing a prohibited "successive" petition, in part
because such treatment would have "perverse" consequences), with id. at 1624 (Thomas, J., joined
by Scalia, J., dissenting) (appealing to dictionary definitions of the statutory terms "application"
and "present[]" to reject the majority's view as inconsistent with the statute's plain meaning).
114 See Scalia, supra note 7.
115 See, e.g., HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 127 (I990); David
A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 0996) Harry
H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83 YALE L.J. 22 1, 265-
31' ('973)-
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tainly no less dynamic than purposivism, which locates purposes in
unchanging text. As Paul Brest wryly observed with respect to the
role of text in constitutional adjudication, "[i]t is rather like having a
remote ancestor who came over on the Mayflower."116 Statutory in-
terpretation is similar: the text recedes in importance as time passes
between a statute's enactment and judicial construction, or - in the
case of new statutes - as unforeseen circumstances arise. Thus, not-
withstanding the debate between textualists and purposivists chroni-
cled in Part I, if the common law method pervades the Court's work,
the Court's doctrines are likely to be dynamic in just the way that the
textualists fear, and that I have suggested they need to be.
There is considerable truth to this account. Hence, Eskridge is jus-
tified in attaching the label "dynamic statutory interpretation" to an
approach that takes its inspiration from the common lave and from
constitutional law's adaptation of common law methods." 7 A dy-
namic common law method takes account of not only the original
meaning of authoritative text, "but also its subsequent interpretational
history, related constitutional developments, and current societal
facts.""" Eskridge does not specify exactly how courts go about taking
account of current societal facts. One possibility, consistent with his
general theory, would be for courts to encourage experimentation and
learning by other social and political actors. 19 Part III maps such an
approach.
I argue in this Part that, as practiced by the Court, the common
law method takes account of changing social circumstances largely un-
consciously, through intuition and speculation. I account for this phe-
nomenon by positing a deep kinship between the traditional common
law method and the Socratic method, concluding that some of the limi-
tations of Plato's elevation of contemplation over experimentation are
also limitations of the traditional common law method.
This Part focuses on the limitations of the common law method.
Because the notion of the "common law" carries a variety of connota-
tions, the first section explains the sense in which I mean it - essen-
tially as a system of elaboration of legal norms on a case-by-case basis.
It then illustrates the pervasive use of the common law method in all
of the Court's work - including not only those decisions that might
otherwise be regarded as purposivist, intentionalist, or eclectic, but
116 Brest, supra note 32, at 234.
117 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, '35 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479
(1987) (advancing the thesis that statutes should, "like the Constitution and the common law[,] be
interpreted 'dynamically,' that is, in light of their present societal, political and legal context").
118 Id.
119 If Eskridge's model were made to encompass the sort of experimentalist attitude toward
factual development that I favor, the model would be prescriptive rather than merely descriptive.
But cf. Scalia, supra note 7, at 40 (arguing that Eskridge's dynamic theory of statutory interpreta-
tion is not descriptive of current practice).
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also those that might be regarded as textualist. The second section
connects the common law method to the Socratic method and to the
limitations of the latter. The third section considers some potential ob-
jections to my characterization of the common law method.
A. The Common Law Method in Supreme Court Adjudication
To say that common law methods inform the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of statutes and the Constitution is not to say that the
Court creates much real common law, in the sense of judge-made law
that does not at least nominally purport to be an interpretation of
some authoritative text. Since the Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 2 0 there has been "no federal general common law,' 12 1 but
until fairly recently, at least, it was plausible to argue that the Supreme
Court had an important role in creating specialized areas of common
law. 12 The Court has recently made clear, however, that it will only
create true federal common law in the rarest of circumstances. 123
Nevertheless, the interpretation of texts can look very much like
common law judging in two ways. First, to the extent that common
law means judge-made law, in the aftermath of legal realism even tex-
tualists concede that in giving concrete content to relatively open-
ended statutory or constitutional provisions, judges do not merely dis-
cover law; they make it.124 For example, the Supreme Court's efforts
over the last decade to restrict the ability of state prisoners to rely on
"new rules" of constitutional law in habeas corpus proceedings' 25 rec-
ognize that those rules of constitutional law were in a real sense cre-
12o 304 U.S. 64 (938).
121 Id. at 78.
122 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-422 (1964).
123 See Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 669-74 (997); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512
U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (characterizing as "few and restricted" "those cases in which judicial creation of
a special federal rule would be justified" (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 0963))).
Specific statutory authorizations of federal common law fall outside of this principle. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 501.
124 See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (I9I) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (acknowledging that judges make law).
125 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1355 (1998) (rejecting the argument that a for-
eign national should be excused from litigating rights under the Vienna Convention on direct re-
view, finding that the claim, if too novel to have been discovered by counsel, would have been a
new rule under Teague v. Lane); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion) (an-
nouncing that, absent one of two narrow exceptions, "new constitutional rules of criminal proce-
dure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are an-
nounced"). In the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress followed the
Court's lead by restricting habeas relief to those cases in which the challenged state court decision
"was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States [or] resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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ated by the Court, even if they found their ultimate warrant in the
Constitution's text.126
The second sense in which textual interpretation looks like com-
mon law judging is the main focus of inquiry here: the common law
method refers to case-by-case development of the law, in which courts
reason by analogy from prior cases rather than deciding each case by
direct reference to the original text under interpretation. 127  The com-
mon law method builds on precedent, unlike our (largely false) picture
of the civil law method of deciding each case according to the enacted
Code alone. 12
The common law method, in the sense of case-by-case doctrinal
development, plays an especially large role in the Court's constitu-
tional rights jurisprudence. 129 For example, in deciding whether a
public television station could, consistent with the First Amendment,
exclude a third-party candidate for the House of Representatives from
a televised debate on the ground that he lacked substantial popular
support, 130 the Court applied its "public forum doctrine,' 13' derived
originally from cases involving public access to streets, sidewalks, and
parks, 32 and subsequently developed in cases involving all manner of
government property.133 Similarly, the Court derived a right to abor-
126 One commentator argues that the tension between the philosophy of the common law and
positivism in this area will ultimately prove destabilizing. See Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say
Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 423 (I994).
127 See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1049);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 201-o6 (1979) (describing the courts' analogical method
and addressing its strengths and weaknesses); Cass P, Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, xo6
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993) (offering an account of analogical reasoning and describing its advan-
tages over more systematic approaches).
128 See Fletcher, supra note 6o, at 994 ('The popular image of codified law is that the statutory
scheme is not only precise, but also comprehensive. In fact, the French and German Civil Codes
are exhaustive in neither sense .... "); see also MIRJAN R_ DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE
AND STATE AUTHORITY 36-38 (1986) (discussing the role of precedent in civil law systems).
129 See Scalia, supra note 7, at 39 (observing that in constitutional law, "[tihe starting point of
the analysis will be Supreme Court cases, and the new issue will presumptively be decided ac-
cording to the logic that those cases expressed, with no regard for how far that logic, thus ex-
tended, has distanced us from the original text and understanding").
130 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1637 (1998).
131 See id. at 1641-44 (finding that the debate was a nonpublic forum to which the minimal
requirements of reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality applied and were satisfied).
132 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 986-87 (2d ed.
2988); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV.
2, 11-21.
133 See, e.g., International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
(airport); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 790 (1985) (fed-
eral employee charity drive literature); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 54-55 (1983) (public school teachers' school mailboxes). For an argument that the formal
application of public forum doctrine in the Court's decision in Forbes played a less important part
than did an analysis of the role of a public television station as a journalist, see Frederick
Schauer, The Supreme Court, x997 Term - Comment: First Amendment Principles, Institutions,
and the First Amendment: Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes and National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, I12 HARV. L. REv. 84, 87-92 (2998).
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tion (in large part) from a right to contraception that was itself derived
(in large part) from cases involving a right to educate one's children. 134
And when the Court, invoking textualism and judicial restraint, has
refused to apply the principles announced in earlier cases, its decisions
have, as a result, appeared arbitrary.135
The use of the common law method is by no means limited to cases
involving the derivation of constitutional rights from broad guarantees
such as free speech and due process. Because of the centrality of
precedent in Anglo-American law, even textualist opinions in statutory
cases exhibit common law properties. Consider, for example, Oncale,
discussed in the previous Part as an instance of textualism. 13 6 The text
of Title VII prohibits "discrimination] because of ... sex.1 13 7  If one
were to look only to the statutory language, or even to the language
plus the circumstances surrounding its enactment, it would not be ob-
vious that male-on-male sexual harassment would be covered. How-
ever, in deciding Oncale, the Court made reference to its earlier cases,
in which it had taken the smaller step of recognizing male-on-female
sexual harassment as a violation of the statute. 138  In addition, the
Court had previously indicated that, in a conventional discrimination
case, a member of one group could be found to discriminate against a
member of the same group. 139 Finally, the Court's Equal Protection
cases stood as a barrier to a rule of law that would make the existence
of a cause of action turn on the sex of the defendant or the defendant's
agent. 140 Taken together, the cases establishing these principles served
as a bridge from the text of Title VII to the result in Oncale. In other
words, Oncale is an example of textualism only in the sense that text
134 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479,
481 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923)).
135 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. I86, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing the majority, which upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that prohibits sodomy,
for "distort[ing] the question this case presents"); TRIBE & DORF, supra note 32, at 58 ("What
emerges [from Hardwick] is a largely arbitrary fiat.").
136 See supra pp. 22-24.
137 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a) (i994).
138 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5io U.S. 17, 22-23 (i993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
139 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, iooi (1998) (citing Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (197 7); id. at 514 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting); and Johnson v. Transpor-
tation Agency, 480 U.S. 66, 624-625 (1987)).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 5r8 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (stating that "a party seeking to
uphold government action based on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
for the classification") (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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plays a relatively laige role within a system that also gives substantial
weight to previously decided cases. 141
Before coming to the critical portions of this Part, I should avert a
potential confusion. When I say that the common law method pro-
ceeds on a case-by-case basis, I do not mean to take a position on the
question of how broad the principles announced in common law deci-
sions are or should be. Case-by-case development is sometimes con-
trasted with an approach that seeks broad principles that unify the
various decided cases. Cass Sunstein draws such a contrast when he
distinguishes his minimalist account of judging from Ronald
Dworkin's view that Anglo-American judges decide cases in a way
that will put the entire legal system in its best light.' 42 According to
Sunstein's view, the practitioner of the common law method is content
to make small moves - to say that a public television debate is more
like government property devoted to a limited purpose 143 than it is like
a public park or a state university that has been opened wide to public
debate.'" In contrast, the theoretician as imagined by Sunstein (or for
that matter, Judge Posner 14 5) would, in each case, seek an interpreta-
tion of the principle of free speech that best effectuates a system of
constitutional government that treats all persons as deserving of equal
respect. 146
However, whether Dworkin or anyone else holds the view of theory
that Sunstein, Judge Posner, and others attribute to him (and to those
with similar views) is doubtful. 47 For his part, Dworkin has been
careful to recognize our legal system's presumptive commitment to
what he calls "local priority," suggesting that a judge turns to princi-
ples of the legal system as a whole only when the boundaries between
141 This phenomenon also shows why the differences between textualists and purposivists are
not very pronounced. For example, in Forney v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 1984 (1998), a unanimous opin-
ion written by Justice Breyer that could as easily have been written by Justice Scalia, the Court's
close analysis of the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994) is intertwined
with its analysis of an earlier decision, Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (199o). See Forney,
118 S. Ct. at 1987 (finding that "[niothing in the language, either of the statute or the Court's
opinion" in Finkelstein, supported the respondent's position).
142 See sources cited supra note 43; see also DwoRKiN, supra note 54, at 225-26 ("According to
law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of jus-
tice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the
community's legal practice.").
143 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1641-43 (1998).
144 See id. at 1642 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (r98I)).
145 See Posner, supra note 15, at 7.
146 See DwoRaiN, supra note 71, at 237.
147 For an example of a scholar attributing such a view to Dworkin and me, see Lawrence Les-
sig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85
GEo. L.J. 1837, 1844 (1997) (Dworkin); id. at 1847 (me). For my response, see Michael C. Dorf,
Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory, 85 GEO. L.J.
1857, 1864-68 (1997).
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distinct doctrinal categories have become mere wooden formalities. 148
Furthermore, common law reasoning contains considerably more the-
ory than Sunstein and other minimalists seem to admit. The pattern
of decided cases crystallizes in doctrines that both exemplify and jus-
tify the underlying pattern. In defining the contours of the public fo-
rum doctrine, the Court did not simply state that a public television
debate is more like one forum or another: it explained why this was so
by reference to the principles, values, and policies the public forum
doctrine purports to serve. 149 Thus, there may not be that much dis-
tance between Sunstein's minimalism on the one hand and Dworkin's
theories on the other hand. 52
Sunstein's critique of Dworkin does, however, suggest an important
distinction between true common law - as created and interpreted by
a state court of last resort - and the common law methodology of
statutory or constitutional interpretation as practiced by the United
States Supreme Court. As the Chief Judge of the New York State
Court of Appeals remarked not long ago, "[e]ven in today's legal land-
scape, dominated by statutes, the common-law process remains the
core element in state court decisionmaking. '1 5 1 When positive law ap-
pears to be silent with respect to some novel question, a state court can
fashion a common law solution, perhaps guided by principles and poli-
cies found in related statutes and constitutional provisions. A federal
court that could not find an answer in positive law, however, would
leave such a matter to private ordering or to the political branches.I 2
Given the wealth of federal statutes and the open-endedness of im-
portant constitutional provisions, this limit may not seem significant.
A determined, "activist" Court could usually connect its ruling to some
authoritative text, could it not? Undoubtedly it could, if it were so in-
clined, but the current Court is not. For the textualists, this disinclina-
tion toward activism is an article of faith, and the purposivists, even if
they recognize a greater role for the Court in gap-filling, believe
strongly in the legal process principle of institutional settlement;1
53
thus, they too are unlikely to take the lead in the way that a state court
149 DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 2-50-54.
149 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, ii8 S. Ct. 1633, 1641-44 (998).
1SO Cf. Dorf, supra note 2o, at 166 (arguing that Dworkin's theory of law as integrity does not
significantly differ from so-called "postmodern" approaches that emphasize practice rather than
interpretive theory). For his part, Dworkin foreswears any sharp distinction between "reasoning"
and "theory." Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, iII HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1723-24 (1998).
151 Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. i, 6 (1995).
152 Cf Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., ii8 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (1998) ("It would be un-
sound, we think, for a statute's express system of enforcement to require notice to the recipient [of
federal funds] and an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance while a judicially implied
system of enforcement permits substantial liability without regard to the recipient's knowledge or
its corrective actions upon receiving notice.").
153 See HART & SACKS, supra note 6,, at 4.
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might. To the extent that Sunstein describes a cautious attitude on the
part of judges, his description seems an apt one for the current United
States Supreme Court, while Dworkin's image of the judge weaving
together the entire fabric of the law seems a better description of some
judges serving on state courts of last resort. 5 4
The foregoing account of the theory/anti-theory debate reveals that
the common law method as currently practiced by the Supreme Court
is somewhat more timid than true common law judging. More gener-
ally, it shows that the common law method, understood in this way, is
ubiquitous in the interpretive work of the Court.
B. Socrates and the Common Law Method
To understand the strengths and the limitations of the Court's deci-
sionmaking processes thus requires an understanding of the strengths
and limitations of the common law method. I explore these by noting
an affinity between the common law method and the Socratic method.
The common law method is a means by which courts decide cases,
the Socratic method a means by which teachers instruct students in
critical thinking.'I5 Although they therefore serve distinct purposes,
the two are closely linked, as a master of the Socratic method, Philip
Areeda, 5 6 observed.' 57 Areeda explained: "The [Socratic method] as
applied to the case method forces the student - and helps him - to
decipher those materials, to reconcile (when possible) what may first
appear to be inconsistent, to apply and appreciate the limits of appar-
ently general principles, and to use analogies, judging better and worse
ones."' 58 The Socratic method conveys substantive doctrine (most
commonly in such first-year private law subjects as torts and con-
tracts), but its principal function is to convey a skill - the ability to
apply the common law method to derive from decided cases sensible
principles of law that can be applied to new cases. 5 9
How exactly is this done? To derive the "best rule," law students in
the Socratic classroom first consider a variety of hypothetical questions
154 See Dorf, supra note 20, at 176 ('Dworkin's vision of law as integrity has always been a bet-
ter description of common law adjudication than of statutory or constitutional interpretation.").
155 See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM
IN LIBERAL EDUCATION 15-49 (1997).
156 For the proposition that Philip Areeda was a master practitioner of the Socratic method, I
invoke my own experience as a student in his Contracts course, as well as the appraisal of his
colleague Clark Byse. See Clark Byse, In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, io9 HARv. L. REV. 894,
896 (1996).
IS7 See Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method, iog HARV. L. REV. 91I, 9I1 (1996) ("[The So-
cratic method] and so-called case method are well suited to each other.").
158 Id. at 9x5.
1S9 The case method as originally conceived by Christopher Columbus Langdell principally
aimed to convey doctrine, but by early in this century its main purpose was understood to be to
teach a methodology. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 21-22
(1995).
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designed to elicit different intuitions and then attempt to formulate
principles that consistently explain their differing intuitions in different
cases. 160 In subject areas in which there is a fixed starting point, such
as a statutory or constitutional provision or a decided case that is
taken to be beyond question, intuitions regarding different hypotheti-
cal fact patterns are considered in relation to the principles of the fixed
starting point. In a constitutional law course, for example, a professor
might explore whether there is a right to same-sex marriage by asking
whether prohibitions of the practice discriminate on the basis of sex in
the same way that anti-miscegenation laws discriminate on the basis of
race.
16 1
Note the similarities between this process and the way in which the
Supreme Court decides its cases. Oral argument in the Court often re-
sembles a Socratic classroom, as the Justices test the rules of law prof-
fered by counsel with hypothetical questions. 62  And of course, the
Justices routinely devote large portions of their written opinions to
matters of precedent, while considering hypothetical cases not directly
before the Court.
63
Note too the connection between the Socratic classroom and the
philosophy of Socrates, as presented by Plato. 164  Throughout the dia-
logues, Socrates interrogates his students' intuitions. Sometimes the
interrogation leads only to the students becoming aware of their igno-
rance, I65 but often the process leads to general agreement about truth.
160 See Max Radin, The Education of a Lawyer, 25 CAL. L. REV. 676, 679 (I937) (observing
that, starting from a decided case, "[t]he Langdellian Socrates may then proceed to determine the
value of the judgment by slight or great variations in the facts, until he has got what is an appar-
ently satisfactory general proposition which will cover this case and a great many others").
161 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. i, 2 (1967) (holding a state prohibition on interracial mar-
riage unconstitutional).
162 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, ii8 S. Ct. 2257 (1998)
(No. 97-569), available in 1998 WL 202275, at *8 (Apr. 22, 1998) ("[S]uppose a supervisor says,
I'm not going to promote you because you're Asian, Hispanic, whatever, and a week later does
promote the person. And the person is no longer even working for that supervisor - promoted
out of the department. Is there a violation there?"); Transcript of Oral Argument, Bragdon v.
Abbott, 1i8 S. Ct. 2 196 (1998) (No. 97--156), available in 1998 WL 141165, at *33 (Mar. 3o, 1998)
("Would it be a disability under the Act if - if I know that - that there is in my family a gene
that causes manic depression, and - and I choose, therefore, not to have children?").
163 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, ii8 S. Ct. 2091, 2120-21 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (comparing the legal effect of the Line Item Veto Act to that of an imaginary health care tax
provision); United States v. Bajakajian, ii8 S. Ct. 2028, 2039 (1998) (comparing the harm caused
by respondent to "that caused by a hypothetical drug dealer who willfully fails to report taking
$12,000 out of the country in order to purchase drugs"); FEC v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1786
(1998) (comparing the injury suffered by the respondent to "a hypothetical example").
164 In his numerous dialogues, Plato depicts Socrates and various students investigating philo-
sophical questions. Whether the dialogues present the historical Socrates, display the evolution of
Plato's thought, or elaborate a coherent philosophy of Plato need not concern us here. See
CHARLES H. KAHN, PLATO AND THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE 38-42 (1996) (summarizing the aca-
demic debate regarding the interpretation of the dialogues).
165 See, e.g., PLATO, Theaetetus, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 141, 2 16-17 (B. Jowett trans.,
Random House 1937 (1892)).
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With Socrates posing suggestive questions, the students come to dis-
card preliminarily held beliefs that turn out to be inconsistent with
more deeply held ones. 166 In the Meno and the Phaedo, Plato con-
tends that the success of Socratic dialogue (elenchus) in eliciting truth
indicates that all persons know everything there is to know prior to
birth, but they forget; Socratic dialogue enables them to remember all
truth. 167 Although this is a strikingly odd view, it appears somewhat
less so when one appreciates that "by 'all truth' Socrates must mean,
not every true statement, but all the truths of philosophy, mathematics
and so on, in fact all necessary truths.' 168 In any event, the validity of
the theory of learning as recollection (anamn~sis) is not in any sense
critical to the utility of the Socratic method. 69
For present purposes, the most salient feature of Socratic dialogue
is the predominant role of abstract reflection as opposed to experi-
ment.170 To be sure, "[t]he absurd view that we should all be wonder-
ful philosophers if we had no sense-organs should not be imputed to
Plato, though his language sometimes asks for it."171 Sensory data do
play a role in the Platonic discovery of knowledge, but only as a
starting point for contemplation about the more perfect realm of
ideas. 7 2 And of course, it is the realm of ideas that, for Plato, consti-
tutes the principal object of philosophical inquiry. 7 3
166 See Gail Fine, Inquiry in the Meno, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO 200, 208-
og (Richard Kraut ed., 1992).
167 See PLATO, Meno 8od-86b, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 277-85 (B. Jowett trans., 4 th ed.
1953); PLATO, Phaedo 73-77b, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra, at 425-31 (attributing to
Socrates the view that conceptual knowledge is actually reminiscence).
168 I.M. CROMBIE, AN EXAMINATION OF PLATO'S DOCTRINES 138 (1963).
169 See Fine, supra note x66, at 214 (noting that even skeptics of anamn~sis "can accept Plato's
claim that one can inquire in the absence of knowledge, because of one's capacity for reflection
and because of one's true beliefs").
170 It has been suggested that the method of instruction in the Meno - in which, through sug-
gestive questioning, Socrates induces a slave boy to "remember" the correct answer to a question
of geometry - is empirical. See DAVID ROSS, PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS I8 (1951) ("[T]he
method by which the slave-boy is got to discover what square has twice the area of that of a given
square is a purely empirical one; it is on the evidence of his eyesight ... ."). Most Plato scholars
disagree, and for good reason. See, e.g., CROMBIE, supra note 168, at 138 ("It is not true, as it is
sometimes said, that Socrates' methods are empirical."); Julius Moravcsik, Learning as Recollec-
tion, in I PLATO: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 53, 56 & n.i (Gregory Vlastos ed., 1970)
(citing Gregory Vlastos, Anamnesis in the Meno, 4 DIALOGUE 143 (1965)). Although Socrates
presents his argument pictorially, he could just as easily have given a rigorous formal proof. "His
proof works as mathematical proofs should work, by extracting the consequences of things previ-
ously agreed to, though some of the steps are omitted." CROMBIE, supra note i68, at 138.
171 CROMBIE, supra note 168, at 564.
172 See Ross, supra note 17o, at 24-25.
173 The allegory of the cave provides the classic illustration. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 123-
28 (I.A. Richards ed. & trans., i966). The allegory has been summarized as follows:
Ordinary human beings, untouched by philosophical education, are likened to prisoners in
a cave who are forced to gaze on shadows created by artificial light and cast by artifacts
paraded by unseen manipulators. Their conception of what exists and of what is worth
having is so severely limited and the deception by which they are victimized is so system-
atic that they cannot even recognize that they are confined, and would not immediately re-
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Modern practitioners of the Socratic method certainly do not be-
lieve that they are helping students to remember forgotten knowledge,
nor do many of them subscribe to Plato's broader views about knowl-
edge and truth. Yet they do seem to share Plato's preference for inter-
rogation of intuition, rather than empirical observation, as the princi-
pal means of deriving knowledge. 7 4
In the modern era, experiment has overthrown the Greek prefer-
ence for intuition in the natural sciences. However, the organization of
our intuitions into what John Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium"' 75
continues to be one of the principal means by which courts resolve
hard cases. Justice Charles Fried, who currently sits on a state court
of last resort and has been for most of his career a Harvard Law
School professor, expressly connects this method with law school peda-
gogy and appellate court decisionmaking: he describes reflective equi-
librium as "very much the method with which we are all familiar in
legal argument. It is what we see in our classrooms and in our court-
rooms."'
1 7 6
The justification for employing something very much like the So-
cratic method (or reflective equilibrium, if you prefer) in legal deci-
sionmaking seems straightforward enough. Law is not a natural or
even a social science.' 77 Law deals chiefly in normative propositions,
and at least since Hume, it has been generally accepted that descrip-
tive propositions cannot entail normative ones.17 This latter notion
differs from the view of the Greeks - especially Plato's student Aris-
totle - who believed in a harmony of the laws of nature and natural
gard an interruption in their routine ways of thought as a liberation. Here Plato is of
course thinking of the psychological resistance Socrates encountered to his questioning; but
he is also making a far more audacious claim, because he means somehow to downgrade
the reality of the ordinary world of sensible objects. The shadows cast on the wall of the
cave are less real than the objects of which they are images; and in the same way, when
the prisoners make progress ... and learn to understand the Forms, they recognize the ex-
istence of a realm of objects that are more real than anything they saw in the cave.
Richard Kraut, Introduction to the Study of Plato, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO,
supra note 166, at i, io-i i (citations omitted).
174 Cf. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 43 (1979) ("There are
few believers in Platonic Ideas today, nor even many who make a distinction between the sensi-
tive and the intellectual soul. But the image of [the mind as mirror] remains with us .... ").
175 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-5 1 (197 1) (describing reflective equilibrium as the
state "reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and has either revised his
judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions").
176 Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, I i i HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1748 (1998).
177 But see DUXBURY, supra note :59, at 14-16 (describing Langdell's view of law as a sci-
ence).
178 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE, OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (Lewis A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford 2d ed. 1978) (I739). If one accepts a teleological account of morality, then descriptive
statements can entail normative ones. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 57-59 (2d ed.
1984). However, modern - and certainly postmodern - sensibilities tend to reject teleology.
See generally id. at 59-61.
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(moral) law.179 Having cut this link, we cannot now turn to nature for
normative propositions; nor can a secular court appeal to expressly re-
ligious conceptions. Our courts are left, it seems, to search for norma-
tivity among propositions that can garner rational consensus - that is,
those that can withstand Socratic interrogation. The transition from
the ancient to the modern age would appear to make the Socratic
method the principal, if not the only, means by which we may conduct
normative discourse. 180
Nonetheless, without disparaging the efficacy of Socratic dialogue
in fostering critical thinking or sorting out moral views, we should rec-
ognize its limitations.' 8 ' To say that empirical propositions cannot
logically entail normative ones is not to say that empirical facts are ir-
relevant to normative questions. For example, whether the benefits of
affirmative action justify stigmatizing its beneficiaries is a normative
179 See, e.g., Ernest Barker, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, POLITICS xi, xlix (Ernest Barker ed. &
trans., 1946) ("What makes the State natural, in [Aristotle's] view, is the fact that, however it
came into existence, it is as it stands the satisfaction of an immanent impulse in human nature
towards moral perfection .... ").
180 Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, In HARv. L. REV. 1751, 1763-
64 (i998) (arguing that the relative moral heterogeneity of our society renders Socratic reasoning
more important for us). Some scholars are more pessimistic regarding the value of Socratic rea-
soning in the modern era. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF
REASON (i998) (arguing that our attempt to promote a discourse of reason within government has
resulted in self-deception and sophistry); Richarai A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, III HARv. L. REV. 1637, 1640-42 (i998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics] (asserting that
reason is powerless to direct moral life and that today's professional moralists are without stand-
ing to produce useful normative judgments). Judge Posner purports to limit his critique to aca-
demic moral philosophy, as opposed to normative reasoning more generally. See Posner, Prob-
lematics, supra, at 1649-5o; Richard A. Posner, Reply to Critics of The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory, Iii HARV. L. REv. 1796, 1802-03 (r998) [hereinafter Posner, Reply to Critics]. The
target of his argument is moral reasoning about ends, as opposed to means, in contested cases.
See id. at 18o3; see also Kronman, supra, at 1751-52 (noting Posner's claim that economics pro-
vides a better normative philosophy than rational argument because it can supply "sound if hum-
ble help in the choice of means - something moral philosophy cannot do").
181 I do not address the question whether the Socratic method systematically disadvantages
women. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine & Jane Balin, Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Ex-
periences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. I, 3 ('[M]any women are alienated
by the way the Socratic method is used in large classroom instruction, which is the dominant
pedagogy for almost all first-year instruction."); Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and
the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1209, 1242 (1988) (finding that male graduates were more likely to prefer Socratic instruc-
tors, and suggesting a cultural feminist explanation). The most comprehensive empirical study of
the subject to date found that "[information about the effects of different kinds of discourse (for
example, the effects of extended Socratic dialog versus other kinds of dialog) was mixed and com-
plicated." Elizabeth Mertz with Wamucii Njogu & Susan Gooding, What Difference Does Differ-
ence Make? The Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. i, 4 (i998). See generally
Elizabeth Garrett, Becoming Lawyers: The Role of the Socratic Method in Modern Law Schools,
I GREEN BAG 2D 199, 203 (1998) (reviewing LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BALIN,
BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAv SCHOOL, & INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997)) (arguing
that the Socratic method, applied with sensitivity, does not discriminate against women).
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question,1 8 2 but whether affirmative action in fact stigmatizes its bene-
ficiaries is at least partly an empirical one. Even those who believe
strongly in the fact/value distinction 18 3 should recognize that legal
questions almost invariably call for some mixture of normative and
empirical analysis. 18 4
Although the Socratic method can be used to lay bare the empirical
assumptions associated with various normative claims, it provides no
tools for testing those assumptions. Students in the Socratic classroom
do not conduct social science experiments, nor do they read of the re-
sults of such experiments. Despite legal realism's successful critique of
the conception of the legal enterprise as a search for "the one true rule
of law which, being discovered, will endure, without change, for-
ever,"'185 to a significant degree, American legal education and Ameri-
can legal reasoning continue to proceed from Langdell's premise that
the answers to difficult legal questions are to be found in the reports of
judicial decisions.18 6
That premise also suffuses the Supreme Court's work. The Court
conducts no evidentiary hearings, even though many of the cases it de-
cides turn on either legislative facts that are not readily susceptible to
judicial notice or adjudicative facts that were not developed in the
trial court. Further, the typical Supreme Court opinion cites dozens of
other Supreme Court cases, but scarcely any empirical data, 8 7 al-
182 For an argument that this sort of cost-benefit analysis is improper in equal protection cases,
see Rubenfeld, cited above in note 33, at pages 440-43.
183 There is a "vast philosophical literature questioning the coherence of the fact/value distinc-
tion." Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 1O5 YALE L.J. 581, 592 (1995) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995)); .ee also id. at 592 n.59 (citing HILARY PUTNAM, THE
MANY FACES OF REALISM 62-71 (1987); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM
xvi (1982); and RORTY, supra note 174, at 363-65, 387).
184 One need not (and I do not) accept Judge Posner's claim that moral reasoning about con-
tested ultimate ends - as opposed to instrumental reasoning about appropriate means to com-
monly accepted ends - plays virtually no role in adjudication, see Posner, Problematics, supra
note 18o, at 1697-98, to recognize that there remains an important role for instrumental reason-
ing. More generally, ends and means often cannot be separated neatly. See Dorf & Sabel, supra
note 17, at 390-95; John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, iii HARV. L. REV. 1768, 1772-73
(1998).
185 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 43 (1977).
186 Robert Gordon remarks that the legal realist project failed at substituting social science
education for the standard "cases and materials" approach, but also observes that such a substitu-
tion was not the legal realists' aim. See Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes:
A Century of Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2223-24 (1996) (reviewing
DUXBURY, supra note I59). Note, however, that the movement from law textbooks containing
only cases to those with both cases and materials may be attributed to the realists. See LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 78--97 (1986).
187 Indeed, one study of the 92 Supreme Court cases involving rules of evidence and trial pro-
cedure from 1970-1988 found that despite readily accessible academic literature, not one of the
Court's majority opinions relied on available data concerning jury behavior. See J. Alexander
Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND.
L.J. 137, 138-39 (990).
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though there are some encouraging indications that the situation may
be changing. 88
The congruence between American legal education and Supreme
Court decisionmaking should not be surprising.8 9 All of the Justices
of the Supreme Court attended AmericaVi law schools during an era in
which Socratic instruction was the almost universal practice, at least
in the formative first year. In addition, before joining the Court, five
of them had substantial experience as teachers in American law
schools. 190 Furthermore, the Justices select law clerks who perform at
the top of their classes, with special emphasis on top performance in
the first, most Socratic year: first-year performance is critical to ob-
taining an initial clerkship with a "feeder" judge and to developing re-
lationships with professors who can provide recommendations. The
Justices are, in other words, steeped in a Socratic legal culture and sur-
rounded by a staff drawn from a more recent version of that same cul-
ture.
But is it fair to characterize the Socratic method as introspective?
According to a different view, "[tihe [Socratic method] is cooperative.
It is the varied viewpoints - sound as well as those that prove un-
sound - that makes the classroom interchange an effective teaching
vehicle for all."'19 In this view, the Socratic method is fundamentally
about dialogue and interaction, and is thus not at all introspective.
The classical Socratic method, however, often produces sham dia-
logue. Socrates deftly leads his students where he wants to take them,
much in the style of a skilled attorney conducting cross-examination
entirely through leading questions. Although contemporary defenders
of the Socratic method in higher education would not characterize So-
188 See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82
CORNELL L. REV. xo8o, 1 05-1o (1997) (compiling data indicating increased citation by lawyers
and judges of nonlegal sources since 19go, and hypothesizing that computer databases making
nonlegal sources more readily accessible to lawyers account for the change).
189 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On the Interdependence of Law Schools and Law Courts, 83 VA.
L. REv. 829, 831 (1997) (agreeing with Judge Carl McGowan's observation "that law teaching and
appellate judging are more alike than any two other ways of working in the law"). I pass over the
question of the relation between the Court's decisionmaking methods and the scholarship pro-
duced by the legal academy. Compare Harry T. Edwards, The* Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MscH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992) (arguing that "judges,
administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much -of the scholarship that is
now produced by members of the academy"), with Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment
of "Impractical" Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2010, 2014-16
(1993) (rejecting the distinction between "practical" and "impractical" scholarship).
190 Three - Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer - were full-time tenured professors before
their appointments to the Courts of Appeal. Justices Stevens and Kennedy served as adjunct law
professors.
191 Areeda, supra note 157, at 917; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 155 , at 19 ("Socratic argu-
ment is not undemocratic."); id. at 32 ("Socratic education should be pluralistic . .. " (emphasis
omitted)).
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cratic dialogue as a sham, they do insist on giving the instructor the
leading role in setting the agenda. 192
Regardless of what occurs in the law school classroom, within the
Supreme Court, the Justices, in principle, deliberate as equals in true
dialogue. Yet in practice, the Justices do not deliberate very much at
all. True, the Justices do seek the opinions of one another: they ask
questions of counsel that sometimes seem aimed more at their col-
leagues; 193 they circulate draft opinions, concurrences, and dissents, as
well as memoranda commenting on these drafts; and occasionally sev-
eral Justices will meet to discuss a case. But at the conferences during
which cases are actually decided, there is virtually no sustained discus-
sion by the Justices as a group. 194 Even were such deliberation to oc-
cur, it would not overcome the limitations of the Socratic method, for
as noted above, the Justices do not represent a wide variety of view-
points and experiences. They, are all lawyers, and given the nature of
their work, necessarily so. The quality of the Court's work product
would almost certainly decline substantially if legal acumen were no
longer a qualification for becoming a Justice. 19s
Consider a second possible defense of the Court's methods. One
might grant that Socratic deliberation cannot solve the Court's fre-
quent difficulties in anticipating the consequences of its decisions.
However, this defense goes, the Court's methods are not entirely So-
cratic.
192 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 155, at 41 ("The most important ingredient of a Socratic class-
room is obviously the instructor."); Areeda, supra note I57, at 921 ("To have a successful socratic
discussion, the instructor must maintain control in order to keep the development clear, orderly,
and moving.").
193 For examples of oral arguments in which the attorney appears to be cast in the role of ven-
triloquist's dummy, see Transcript of Oral Argument, Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht,
118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998) (No. 97-461), available in 1997 WL 878311, at *30-*5 ° (Apr. 20, 1998), and
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Cabrales, 118 S. Ct. 1772 (1998) (No. 97-643),
available in 1998 WL 221362, at *i5-*i9 (Apr. 29, 1998).
194 See Stephen Wermiel, Scrappy Jurist: Justice Antonin Scalia, On the Court Two Years,
Points Way to Future, WALL ST. J., July I, I988, at Ai (reporting Justice Scalia's statement that
"[n]ot much conferencing goes on" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The scarcity of delibera-
tion on the Court has been a longstanding problem. For example, Justice Powell described the
Court as "nine small, independent law firms." Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Address at the Ameri-
can Bar Association Annual Meeting (976), quoted in Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme
Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. I, 18-19 (1979); see also id. at 15 ("[T]he Reconstruc-
tion Court opinions cannot be meaningfully characterized as the end products of a process de-
signed to achieve a 'maturing of collective thought."' (citations omitted)).
195 But cf JOHN P. FRANK, CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 112 (I99I) ("IT]here are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are enti-
tled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and
Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like that there." (quoting Senator Hruska's remarks sup-
porting President Nixon's choice of Judge Harrold Carswell for a seat on the Supreme Court) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
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For example, in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes,196 discussed briefly above and extensively elsewhere in this is-
sue, 197 the Court rejected the claim that the organizers of a public
television debate were required by the First Amendment to include all
candidates whose names appeared on the ballot. 98 The Court noted
that in response to the Eighth Circuit's acceptance of the claim, a Ne-
braska public television station had canceled a scheduled debate. 99
Pointing to the logistical difficulties of holding debates with ten or
more candidates, the Court concluded that ruling for the plaintiff
"would result in less speech, not more."200 In other words, the Court
treated the period between the Eighth Circuit's decision and its own as
a miniature experiment. This approach was entirely sensible, but
given the Court's usual decisionmaking methods, not readily gener-
alizable.20 ' Cases like Forbes - in which the litigation itself produces
valuable data prior to the case's final resolution - are unusual.
Still, the defense continues, the Court has means to avail itself of
expert opinion. The "Brandeis brief" was pioneered nearly a century
ago, 20 2 and today, the Court receives numerous briefs forecasting the
likely undesirable consequences of potential decisions.
Although Brandeis briefs undoubtedly make a difference from time
to time, the Court's dominant methodologies discourage their filing
and reduce their impact when filed. Typically, detailed projections
about consequences and social conditions appear, if at all, in amicus
briefs rather than party briefs, which tend to be focused on doctrine.
20 3
Good lawyers understand that they must allocate their limited number
of pages to the arguments they believe will be most effective. The
great majority of lawyers practicing before the Court understand that
196 1r8 S. CL 1633 (1998).
197 See Schauer, supra note 133, at 87-92.
198 See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
199 See id. at 1643.
200 Id.
201 Below I suggest an approach to the certiorari process that would enable the Court to take
advantage of this sort of experience on a more regular basis. See infra Part III.B.
202 Louis Brandeis's brief for the state in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (Igo8), is the paradigm
of a legal argument based on empirical data. See TRIBE, supra note 132, at 569 & n.2.
203 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598-99 (1993) (noting that the
arnicus briefs filed in the case "are markedly different from typical briefs, in that large parts of
them do not deal with decided cases or statutory language - the sort of material we customarily
interpret") (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice's dissent also revealed the skepticism
with which many justices view anicus briefs:
[The arnicus briefs] deal with definitions of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scien-
tific validity, and peer review - in short, matters far afield from the expertise of judges.
This is not to say that such materials are not useful or even necessary in deciding how [the
Federal Rule of Evidence governing expert testimony] should be applied; but it is to say
that the unusual subject matter should cause us to proceed with great caution in deciding
more than we have to, because our reach can so easily exceed our grasp.
Id. at 599.
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conventional legal arguments have a substantially greater impact on
the Court than social science data and projections.
For example, in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v.
Scott,2 O4 the Court eschewed empirical data in holding the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule inapplicable to parole revocation hear-
ings. The Court asserted, without any empirical support, that "the
remote possibility that the subject [of an illegal search or seizure will
be] a parolee and that the evidence may be admitted at a parole revo-
cation proceeding surely has little, if any, effect on the officer's incen-
tives. '20 5  The dissenters likewise based their contrary conclusion on
reason unencumbered by empirical evidence, concluding that "if the
police need the deterrence of an exclusionary rule to offset the tempta-
tions to forget the Fourth Amendment, parole officers need it quite as
much. '20 6 To be sure, measuring the deterrent effect of the exclusion-
ary rule entails methodological problems, 20 7 especially given the diffi-
culty of controlling for such factors as police perjury. Nevertheless,
some instructive studies have been undertaken. 20 8  Even if the studies
do not completely resolve the question, they are hardly irrelevant. In-
deed, the Court's abandonment of the view that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires exclusion to restore the status quo ante20 9 would appear
to have made such measurements of the exclusionary rule's effective-
ness essential to the Court's search-and-seizure jurisprudence. 2 10
However, until the Court demonstrates a willingness to use empirical
evidence, it will not receive much help from the bar.
21
'
I have suggested that the common law method at work in most of
the Court's decisions has strong affinities with the Socratic method,
which in turn is linked to the Greeks' preference for contemplation
204 u18 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
205 Id. at 2022.
206 Id. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1976) (noting that "although scholars have
attempted to determine whether the exclusionary rule in fact does not have any deterrent effect,
each empirical study on the subject, in its own way, appears flawed"); see also Dallin H. Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 709-19 (1970)
(discussing potential difficulties with techniques that aim to measure empirically the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule).
208 See, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
311 (1991); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empiri-
cal Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. ioi6 (1987).
209 See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation, 118 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1389 (1983)).
210 If one believes that the Fourth Amendment itself does not require exclusion, one might
think the Court lacks the authority to impose it as a remedy because suppressing trustworthy evi-
dence of one person's guilt does not clearly remedy an illegal search. See AKHIL REED AMIAR,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 151 (1997).
211 There are, however, some encouraging signs that the use of such evidence will increase. See
infra p. 56.
I998] THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD 43
over experimentation and experience. These affinities are part of the
American legal culture, transmitted through American law schools and
related institutions. To recognize that some of the Court's limitations
originate in that culture is to recognize that they will be difficult,
though not impossible, to change. In the next Part, I consider modest
steps the Court could take to improve its ability to adapt doctrine to
new or unforeseen circumstances. Before coming to these, however, I
address several objections to my characterization of the common law
method as practiced by the Court.
C. Objections
At the beginning of this Part, I acknowledged the common law
method's dynamism, but stated (without supplying an argument) that
evolution by the common law method is largely unconscious.2 12 I shall
now support this point by responding to the objection that the very
genius of the common law method is its adaptability. Holmes was one
proponent of this view. In reference to the common law, he famously
observed: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence."2 1 3 Holmes implies that as each new case presents new facts and
circumstances, the common law judge adapts established principles to
fit.
Moreover, the Holmesian objection continues, the great common
law judge understands his task as permitting him on occasion to re-
conceptualize and thereby change the law. Thus, in holding a manu-
facturer liable for damages resulting from its failure to detect a defec-
tive component part notwithstanding the contract rule of privity,
Judge Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 214 stated that
"[p]recedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit
the conditions of travel to-day."215 He thereby laid the groundwork for
modern products liability law. Similarly, in his well-known concur-
rence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 216 Justice 'raynor proposed
shifting the standard of care in products liability cases from negligence
to strict liability.217
I would respond that MacPherson and Escola are great cases de-
cided by great judges, and for just that reason they stand as exceptions
to, rather than examples of, the usual common law method. To bor-
row a much abused analogy, MacPherson and Escola are paradigm
212 See supra p. 27.
213 HOLMES, supra note 12, at i.
214 111 N.E. io5o (N.Y. 1916).
215 Id. at 1053.
216 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
217 See id. at 440.
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shifts.2 18  Moreover, even these paradigm-shifting cases may be seen
more accurately in gradualist terms. Justice 'Ilaynor's Escola concur-
rence built on MacPherson,21 9 and MacPherson itself was hardly un-
precedented; in MacPherson, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
a unanimous decision of the intermediate appellate court. 220 In gen-
eral, the great common law opinions such as Cardozo's in Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad,22 l or Hand's in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co.,222 are known for their elegant synthesis of existing precedent,
rather than for doctrinal innovation.22 3
The great common law cases are also extraordinary in their re-
course to first principles and direct considerations of public policy. As
Holmes elaborated in describing the common law's typical relation to
practical experience, "[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow
men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men shou]d be governed. '224 Notably, in this pas-
sage, Holmes was speaking as a proto-legal realist,225 providing an ac-
count of what the courts actually do, rather than of the methods they
understand themselves to be applying.2 26  Cases like MacPherson,
Escola, Palsgraf, and Carroll Towing are extraordinary in their con-
scious consideration of public policy;2 27 Holmes acknowledges that,
more commonly, considerations of public policy are at best uncon-
scious, as doctrinal analysis dominates.
A zealous legal realist might counter that it makes no difference
whether courts embrace policy considerations openly or surreptitiously,
because the result will be the same, but this response seems more an
expression of faith than a realist(ic) analysis of the world as it is. Tex-
218 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 47-48 (3d ed.
1996).
219 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (citing MacPherson).
220 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 145 N.Y.S. 462, 465 (App. Div. 1914).
221 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
222 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
223 See id. at 172-73.
224 HOLMES, supra note 12, at i.
225 See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1236
(1987); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 65I, 653 & n.6 (I995).
226 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173
(1920) (describing the law as "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact").
227 Linda Meyer characterizes MacPherson as one of the "great works of the common law."
Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647, 664 (1998). However, I do
not read her to imply that all common law decisions would look like MacPherson, even if they
were decided by judges who shared Cardozo's gifts. See id. at 665 ("[L]ooking past the doctrine
does not mean that one must look past all the doctrine all the time."); cf. Sanford Levinson, On
Positivism and Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25
CONN. L. REV. 843, 849-50 (1993) (describing the propensity of lower federal courts to focus on
doctrine).
i998] THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD 45
tualism, purposivism, the common law method, and the like are cogni-
tive structures for processing legal problems. The legal realist is un-
doubtedly correct that the cognitive structures do not completely de-
termine decisions, but that hardly shows that they are irrelevant.
Given the importance of cognitive structures to human behavior gen-
erally,228 it would be remarkable if they did not play a significant role
in judicial decisionmaking. Indeed, it has long been a commonplace
that judges feel themselves constrained by doctrine, even when they
wish they were not.229 Yet our hypothetical legal realist offers little
more than professions of faith in favor of his contrary view.
Perhaps then, the defender of the common law method need only
reformulate his argument to say that the forms and methods of legal
decisionmaking make no substantial difference in the long run, be-
cause, particularly in a common law system, the law will eventually
transform itself in both substance and form. 23 0 Maybe so, but life and
law occur in the short run.231 Gradualist common law evolution takes
place over the course of generations. As the pace of technological and
social change continues to accelerate, the claim that rules of law for-
mulated through this gradual process will eventually respond to the
demands of new social problems increasingly amounts to the claim
that the law will adapt to conditions that no longer exist.2 32
The defender of the modern common law method may nonetheless
attempt to salvage the objection by arguing that my characterization
of the common law method, even if accurate of the age of formalism, is
now anachronistic. In Holmes's time, most judges may have disguised
their policy judgments, but today's judges do not, the defender asserts.
He points to the rise of an expressly consequentialist approach to ju-
risprudence - law and economics. Moreover, legal realism itself has
left an indelible mark, so that the element of policy choice inherent in
adjudication is now widely acknowledged. Indeed, the very goal of
one important strand of legal realism was to displace the speculation
and intuition of the traditional common law method with a conscious
reliance on empirical methods. 233
Yet the intellectual developments identified above have not
changed the basic character of the common law method as practiced
228 See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS 153 (1987); J.M. Balkin,
Ideology as Cultural Software, i6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1224-25 (1995).
229 See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 1 13, 117-I8 (192 1).
230 See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note I2, at 35-38.
231 Cf JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 8o (1924) ("In the long
run we are all dead.").
232 See, e.g., supra p. 12.
233 See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 8og, 833-34 (I935); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 253-54
(1931); see also DUXBURY, supra note 159, at 79-97 (describing the development of realism and its
attitude toward the social sciences).
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by the Supreme Court. Consider law and economics. Outside the con-
text of business cases, judges often invoke economic analysis merely as
a means of translating into the language of social science their choice
of utilitarian visions of justice rather than deontological ones. Even
were the vocabulary of economics not available, one imagines the as-
sessments would be much the same. Indeed, one need not even point
out the difficulty economists face quantifying noneconomic values, be-
cause one rarely sees an effort to assign numerical values to those that
can be quantified. 234  This should not be surprising, because for the
most part, economics is not an empirical social science,2 35 despite the
claims of some of its proponents. 236
This is hardly to say that economics is useless in predicting the
consequences of various legal regimes. There are many economic pre-
dictions that are beyond doubt. For legal actors, perhaps the most use-
ful general proposition is that the potential of liability for an activity
or product will make the activity or product more expensive and thus
decrease demand for it.237 But whatever the utility of law and eco-
nomics, it has had only a small influence on the Supreme Court. Lib-
erals distrust law and economics because it undervalues "soft" vari-
ables, 238 while conservatives who sing the praises of judicial restraint
cannot embrace its open celebration of judicial policymaking. 239 As a
result, the leading judicial proponents of law and economics seem un-
likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court.
234 For example, after providing his algebraic formula for negligence, Judge Hand did not pur-
port to replace any of the variables with actual or even imagined figures. See United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., I59 F.2d 169, 173 (:!d Cir. 1947).
235 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1500 (I998); Wassily Leontief, Academic Economics, 217
SCIENCE 104, 107 (letter to the editor).
236 See, e.g., Posner, Problematics, supra note 18o, at 1647 ("[T]here have been a fair number of
'natural' experiments in economics ... that cumulatively provide impressive evidence for central
predictions of economics ....").
237 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1984). Making an activity more expensive to under-
take will often be the point of liability. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 103-07 (1970).
238 See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount
Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267, 275-77 (i993); Peter J.
Hammer, Free Speech and the "Acid Bath" An Evaluation and Critique of Judge Richard Pos-
ner's Economic Interpretation of the First Amendment, 87 MICH. L. REV. 499, 515- 16 (I988)
(noting that law and economics has difficulty accounting for the value of "process"); Laurence H.
Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592,
596 (I985) (arguing that the difficulty with law and economics "is not only that 'soft' variables -
such as the value of vindicating a fundamental right or preserving human dignity - tend to be
ignored or understated, but also that entire problems are reduced to terms that misstate their
structure and that ignore the nuances that give these problems their full character").
239 See Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 8 29-32 (1986).
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Next, consider the impact of legal realism on the Court. The legal
realist erosion of the division between law and policy has certainly
played a substantial role in shaping the Supreme Court's docket. As I
discuss below, however, even legal realism has had only a limited im-
pact on the way the Court decides the cases it hears.
Admittedly, the three dramatic doctrinal reversals accomplished in
the late I930s were all in large measure responses to legal realist in-
sights: in abandoning a restrictive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, the Court acknowledged that locating the line between local
and interstate transactions was more a policy judgment than an inter-
pretive one, and thus best left to Congress;240 similarly, in repudiating
the Lochner era's protection of property and contract, the Court initi-
ated a period of deference to federal and state legislative judgments; 241
and in taking the federal courts out of the business of announcing gen-
eral principles of common law in diversity suits, the Court expressly
relied on the realist critique of its earlier practice.2 42 Furthermore, in a
more recent, but related development, the understanding of legal in-
terpretation as a political enterprise accounts in large measure for the
Court's willingness to defer to administrative agencies' reasonable in-
terpretations of ambiguous statutory texts.243
The triumph of legal realism thus accounts for the Supreme
Court's default of deference to political actors. One could understand
this practice of deference as a means of adapting to changing circum-
stances: other things being equal, elected officials are more responsive
to changing public values and attitudes than are courts. To the extent
that administrative agencies are understood as independent experts,
they are better able to keep up with the details of a changing world
than are the courts; to the extent that they are understood as agents of
the Executive branch, they share in the democratic nature of that
branch and receive deference on that basis.244 By reducing the Court's
overall share of responsibility in the elaboration of legal norms, the
deference default of the modern era responds to the Court's under-
standing of the limits of its own abilities and legitimacy.
240 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. o0, 114 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 3oi U.S. 1, 29-30 (1937).
241 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937).
242 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 & n.23 (1938) (citing Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (i9io) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Black & White Taxicab and Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 5,8, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting)). Although I have argued that Erie is best justified on federalism grounds, see Dorf, su-
pra note 225, at 709, I do not deny that the Erie Court itself relied largely on legal realist notions.
243 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(984).
244 See generally Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 760-77 (i996) (describing the development of greater
political control over administrative agencies that roughly coincided with the beginning of the
Carter Administration).
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Lawrence Lessig's theory of "fidelity in translation" nicely captures
the leading place of deference in the modern constitutional order.2 45
As a general matter, Lessig's theory addresses the same broad issue
addressed in this Foreword -- how courts can faithfully apply authori-
tative text to circumstances dramatically different from those that pre-
vailed when the text was adopted. His answer emphasizes dynamism,
suggesting that preservation of meaning sometimes entails giving a
changed reading to an unchanged text in light of social context.
246
Thus, he invokes the "Erie-effect" to explain the emergence of defer-
ence in post-I937 Supreme Court jurisprudence: as courts came to ac-
cept the legal realist insight. that interpretation is a political activity,
they engaged in less interpretation, preferring to allocate decisional
authority to other, usually more accountable, actors.
2 47
However, the limitations of Lessig's theory reveal why legal realism
has had only a modest impact on the way the Court decides the cases
it hears. Although Lessig's theory provides a plausible account of the
default settings of existing doctrine, it has relatively little to say about
most of the issues the Court confronts in the cases that are actually
litigated. After all, the Court does not follow the approach of James
Bradley Thayer, who argued that, regardless of the nature of the
claims involved, the Court should invalidate decisions taken by ma-
joritarian institutions only when those decisions very clearly violate
the Constitution. 248  To be sure, one sees something of Thayer's view
245 See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 395 (995) (accounting for changed interpretations of constitutional text by noting the
changed contexts to which the text was to be applied).
246 See id. at 402-03.
247 See Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 11o: An Essay on Context in Interpretive The-
ory, iio HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1795 (1997); Lessig, supra note 245, at 432-38. I refer to these other
actors as only "usually" more accountable because modern federal jurisprudence accords defer-
ence to actors who are not directly accountable. First, federal courts defer to state judges under
the Erie doctrine, regardless whether these judges are elected or appointed. See Bradford R.
Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism after Erie,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495-1517 (1997) (questioning the relevance of legal realism and legal
positivism to Erie doctrine); Dorf, supra note 225, at 695-715 (same). Second, even though ad-
ministrative agencies can be more democratically accountable than courts, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 550-55 (I997) (book review), judicial
review of agency decisions does not invariably present the same legitimacy questions as judicial
review of statutes. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Be-
yond the Countermajoritarian Difficuity, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 764 (I997) ("[Arguments for
judicial restraint, effective with respect to the judicial practice of invalidating statutes, might
have little or no force with respect to the practice of invalidating agency rules, orders and actions
.... "). For an account that emphasizes the importance of the popular rejection of pre-1937 doc-
trine rather than legal realism, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
279-382 (1998).
248 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REx'. 129, 130 (1893).
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in the Court's willingness to presume most statutes constitutional,249
but even as the Court was adopting a general policy of deference in the
late 1930s, it marked out special areas in which the presumption of
constitutionality does not apply.2 50 Since the rights revolution of the
Warren Court, and to a lesser degree the Burger Court,25 ' those special
areas - infringements of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, laws
restricting the political process, and laws burdening the rights of mi-
nority groups - have come to dominate constitutional law, so that the
default of deference often plays no substantial role in constitutional ad-
judication.25 2 Indeed, in recent years, the Court has shown a willing-
ness to suspend the presumption of constitutionality in other areas,
such as federalism and separation of powers, as well.
25 3
Deference continues to play an important role in challenges to ad-
ministrative interpretations of federal statutes, but two phenomena
limit the impact of the deference default here as well. First, many of
the Court's statutory interpretation cases do not involve review of an
agency interpretation, 25 4 so deference is not an option. Second, the
Court will only defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
texts, and the influence of textualism has meant a greater willingness
249 See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2158 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part) (noting that prospective economic legislation carries a pre-
sumption of constitutionality); Hudson v. United States, 1i8 S. CL 488, 501 ('997) (Souter, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (referring to "the presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by an ostensi-
bly civil statute making no provision for the safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants").
250 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,152 n.4 (1938). One such demarca-
tion occurs in the Court's treatment of legislative facts. Under rational basis review, the Court
will presume the existence of facts that would make the challenged legislation rational. See Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (955) (speculating about what "[tihe legislature might
have concluded"). When specially protected rights are at stake, the Court will sometimes call for
judicial factfinding. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 667-68 (1994). See also
Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases after Turner
Broadcasting, iii HARv. L. REV. 2313, 2313-29 (x998) (observing the Court's somewhat inconsis-
tent approach to legislative facts and proposing an alternative).
251 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 24-3 1 (1990).
252 The principal exceptions to this proposition are cases in which a party seeks recognition of
an unenumerated right under the rubric of substantive due process. In recent years, the Court
has expressly invoked principles of deference to justify its unwillingness to recognize such "new"
rights, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 226o (1997), although it also appears un-
willing to cut back substantially on rights previously recognized, see Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992), or even to abandon apparently subjective substantive due process
tests, such as whether government conduct "shocks the conscience," see supra note 6.
253 See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, ii8 S. Ct. 2091 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act
violates the lawmaking procedure of Article I); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (I995) (hold-
ing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause).
254 See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, i8 S. Ct. 1969 (1998); AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc.,
118 S. CL I956 (1998).
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in recent years to find that an administrative interpretation conflicts
with a statute's clear text.2 55
The Court decides cases in which a plausible argument can be
made for a range of results, and lawyers will therefore bring cases
characterizing their clients' claims as fitting within the windows left
open - that is, cases in which the deference default does not apply325 6
Thus, lawyers do not bring cases challenging minimum wage or
maximum hour legislation as violating the economic rights of employ-
ers and employees, and if they do bring them, the claims are dismissed
before reaching the Supreme Court. In other words, legal realism,
through the deference default, plays a large role in shaping the Court's
docket, but only a limited one in resolving cases. 257  In the cases that
do reach the Court, the Justices continue to apply the traditional
common law method - with its preference for intuition and specula-
tion rather than systematic experimentation.
25 8
255 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 990-91 (1992); Merrill, supra note 99, at 354 ("[T]he general pattern in the Court appears to
suggest something of an inverse relationship between textualism and use of the Chevron doc-
trine.").
256 Hence, because substantive due process provides a weak basis for economic claims, shrewd
lawyers will rely on provisions such as the Excessive Fines Clause, see United States v. Bajaka-
jian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 (1998) (invalidating as an excessive fine a $357,444 forfeiture for failure
to report transportation of currency), and the Takings Clause, see Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, i 18 S.
Ct. 2131, 2149-2153 (1998) (plurality opinion) (finding that retroactive civil liability was an un-
constitutional taking). Note, however, that five Justices in Eastern Enterprises - the four dis-
senters, see id. at 2163-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting), plus Justice Kennedy concurring in the judg-
ment, see id. at 2158 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) - were
prepared to recognize a valid substantive due process claim in some cases of purely economic in-
jury resulting from retroactive legislation. Difficulties inherent in distinguishing prospective from
retroactive liability, see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
i io HARV. L. REV. 1O56, 1O67-73 (I997), were left for another day.
257 In fairness to Lessig, whose theory I used above as a foil, I should note that he attempts to
explain the absence of the deference default rule in constitutional cases by sharply distinguishing
between government powers and individual rights. Politicization of the grounds for government
action, Lessig posits, warrants judicial deference, while politicization of "the defense against judi-
cial action" warrants judicial activism. Lessig, supra note 147, at 1842; see also Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1414 (1997) (distinguishing between cases
involving government powers and those involving individual rights). I find the distinction be-
tween powers and rights unavailing. As I have previously noted:
In rights cases, the default is set against government power only after a right is found. Yet
in the most controversial cases, the very question is whether there is a right. Unless there
is a general right to liberty (which, constitutionally speaking, there is not), the mere asser-
tion of a constitutional right should not alter the default. Discerning whether a right exists
in the first place would still seem to require a thicker normative theory than Lessig pro-
vides.
Dorf, supra note ii, at 1786 n.16. Lessig's favorite examples involve equality rather than lib-
erty, see Lessig, supra note 147, at 1843-46, but he faces the same problem, because just as there
is no general right to liberty, so most government classifications receive only minimal scrutiny.
258 Again, I do not claim that the Justices do not consider the likely consequences of various
possible decisions. They do, see Zeppos, supra note 22, at 1 107-13, but by relying principally on
intuition and speculation rather than on empirical data.
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IH. A MODEST REFORM AGENDA
The Court's institutional posture and adjudicatory methods con-
strain its ability to learn about the world in which its doctrines oper-
ate. Within the existing framework of American democracy, little can
be done about the institutional constraints, but some modest changes
could be made to the Court's adjudicatory method to improve its
knowledge base. This Part proposes reforms that would enable the
Court to do a better job of adjusting its interpretations of authoritative
text to new, unforeseen, and changing circumstances. The first section
considers methods by which the Court may expressly take into account
the social consequences of its decisions, and finds that these methods
may result in marginal improvements. The second section offers a
number of doctrinal modifications that would improve the Court's
ability to learn from experience. The third section briefly explains
how these doctrinal modifications would work in practice. The final
section argues that, notwithstanding the need for better mechanisms
by which the Court can inform itself of practical realities, there re-
mains an important place in its jurisprudence for the articulation of
values.
A. Consequences, Principles, and Social Science
This Foreword has criticized the Court's interpretive methods for
paying insufficient explicit attention to the empirical assumptions un-
derlying, and the practical consequences of, its decisions. Judge Pos-
ner has recently leveled similar charges, arguing that the Court ought
to make greater use of social science research. 25 9 This section elabo-
rates on how the Court might improve its ability to gather informa-
tion. It cautions, however, that such efforts - welcome as they may
be - will not greatly improve the Court's situation.
Before offering concrete proposals, however, I must address the ob-
jection that it is unfair to criticize the Court for its policymaking be-
cause courts are meant to be fora of principle rather than policy.2 60
Taking account of consequences requires some metric by which com-
peting interests are compared; but in many of the most important
cases, one party will claim a right not to have her interests thrown into
the hopper to be balanced along with all other potential claims. She
will, in other words, argue that her right acts as a trump that pre-
cludes balancing. 261
259 See Posner, supra note 1s, at 12.
260 See DWORKN, supra note 16, at 69 (distinguishing principle from policy); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977) (same).
261 The leading proponent of this view is Ronald Dworkin. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 26o, at xi CIndividual rights are political trumps held by individuals. In-
dividuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for
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We might initially respond that rights do not in fact function as
trumps. Under existing constitutional doctrine, for example, rights can
typically be overridden if the government shows that a challenged
regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering some compelling
interest. 262  This possibility of balancing away rights makes good
sense, at least in some cases. Who among us would be willing to pre-
serve the right to free speech at the cost of, say, thermonuclear war2 63
or even a riot?264 Rights, in other words, are not trumps in the sense
that they exclude all consideration of consequences. Instead, they are
at most "shields"2 65 against weak or unacceptable reasons for govern-
ment action.266
Moreover, even non-consequentialists care about consequences, at
least in the absence of a rights-based or other deontological reason to
ignore them. For example, Ronald Dworkin has expressed sympathy
for the view that the rule prescribed in New York Times v. Sullivan
267
- which announced a "reckless disregard" standard for state libel ac-
tions for damages brought by public officials 268 (and which was later
extended to public figures) 26 9 - should be extended to suits by ordi-
nary citizens, as long as all plaintiffs may sue for a judicial declaration
denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for
imposing some loss or injury upon them.").
262 See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (199o) (holding
that the state interest in the integrity of the political process justifies overriding a corporation's
right to use general treasury funds for independent expenditures on behalf of political candidates);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 0973) (stating that the state interest in the potential life of a
viable fetus justifies overriding a pregnant woman's right to abortion, absent a threat to her
health or life).
263 Cf. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 99o, 995 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining
publication of an article titled, "The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It").
264 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 & n.4 (I969) (recognizing "incitement to immi-
nent lawlessness" as a basis for government to proscribe speech).
265 See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429-31
(I993).
266 See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998) ("Rights are not general trumps against
appeals to the common good or anything else; instead, they are better understood as channeling
the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas."); cf. RAz, supra note
127, at 2 8-33 (explaining that devices such as rights act to exclude some kinds of reasons from the
decisional calculus). Judge Posner's view does not appear to acknowledge even this much. For
example, in discussing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginia, 5 i8 U.S. 5 15
(1996), he posits that the critical question in the case should have been "whether excluding women
from [the Virginia Military Institute] is likely to do more harm to women ... than including them
would do to the mission of training citizen-soldiers." Posner, supra note 15, at 16. This unabash-
edly utilitarian formulation gives no weight at all to the right of women to be free from sex dis-
crimination. Taking that right seriously does not mean that other interests can never outweigh
the right, but it should mean that overriding the right requires something more than a showing
that doing so would increase aggregate social utility.
267 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
268 Id. at 2 79-8o.
269 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. Y30, 155 (1967).
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that a statement was false without having to satisfy the Sullivan crite-
ria.270 The apparent basis for Dworkin's proposal is that such a rule
would do a better job than the Sullivan regime at securing the values
of the First Amendment. Whether the proposal would in fact better
serve that goal is essentially an empirical question about the conse-
quences of the two approaches. 271
Considerations of consequences do not merely figure into the deci-
sion about how to implement rights; they often play a substantial role
in deciding whether a right exists or how far it extends.2 7 2 More fun-
damentally, if one rejects both moral realism (the belief in the existence
of objective moral truths) 273 and thoroughgoing moral skepticism (the
belief in the unprovability or even incoherence of all moral claims) -
and I read our legal culture to be uncomfortable with both of these
belief structures - she will recognize that the specification of rights
can only proceed in concrete contexts within which particulars mat-
ter.27 4 Also, much adjudication - especially in statutory interpreta-
tion cases - does not involve rights at all, except in the conclusory
sense that the winner of the case can be said to have a purely legal
right to whatever she has won.
Thus, the adjudicatory domain in which consequences matter is
substantial. What can the Court do to improve its empirical under-
standing within this domain? Judge Posner's answer is that the Jus-
tices should make greater use of social science (and that the legal acad-
emy should turn its attention to producing more such work and less
work like, say, this Foreword).275  Judge Posner acknowledges that
"[t]he capability of the courts to conduct scientific or social scientific
research is extremely limited, and perhaps nil."276  Nonetheless, he
contends, "their assimilative powers are great[]."277 This seems a con-
siderable overstatement, based perhaps on Judge Posner's projection of
his own eclectic intellectual appetite onto his colleagues on the federal
bench. In this age of specialization, generalist judges simply cannot
keep up with the latest developments in all of the fields relevant to
their work.278
270 See DwoRKiN, supra note 7r, at 212-13.
271 For another alternative to the Sullivan rule, see Paul A. Freund, The Judicial Process in
Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 493, 498.
272 See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, iog HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1227 (1996).
273 See Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, go MIcH. L. REv. 2424, 2425 (1992).
274 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 446-52.
275 See Posner, supra note 15, at 11-22.
276 Id. at 12; accord Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences on
Law and Policy, io LAw & POL. 167, rgi (ig8s) (arguing that judges have limited access to social
science information).
277 Posner, supra note rs, at 12.
278 On the limits of nonspecialist judges, see Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and
Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998). Judge Posner, who is familiar with the spe-
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How might the Court improve its ability to assimilate information?
One obvious starting point would be the composition of its staff. A re-
cent kiss-and-tell account of the Court asserts that the Justices delegate
an alarmingly large share of their work to their law clerks.2 79  Based
upon my own experience, the claim appears to be quite exaggerated, 2 0
but even if one were to accept at face value the reports about influen-
tial law clerks, the Justices would still be left doing much more of their
own work than officials at comparable levels in other branches of the
cialized literature of numerous academic fields, appears to be a counterexample, although even he
has been accused of dilettantism. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, ii HARV. L.
REV. 1776, 1782 (1998) (contending that Posner's Holmes Lectures inaccurately portray academic
philosophy). The accusation is at least somewhat apt. For example, in the same lecture Nuss-
baum critiques for its philosophical errors, Judge Posner erroneously refers to bonobos as "a spe-
cies of monkey." Posner, Problematics, supra note I8o, at 1661. See also Richard A. Posner, Ra-
tional Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 155 1, 1565 (1998) (referring
to "chimpanzees and other monkeys"). Chimpanzees and bonobos (sometimes called pygmy chim-
panzees) are not monkeys. They are hominoid apes. See FRANS DE WAAL, BONOBO: THE
FORGOTTEN APE, at vi (1997). Judge Posner further asserts that feminists admire bonobos be-
cause females are dominant, adding that "[ilt would make as much sense to admire sharks, vul-
tures, or leeches." Posner, Problematics, supra note 18o, at 1661; see id. at 1661 n.4o (quoting DE
WAAL, supra). Yet behavioral patterns of bonobos and chimpanzees - species more closely re-
lated to humans than they or we are to any other extant species, see DE WAAL, supra, at 3 - are
obviously more relevant to claims about human behavior than behavioral patterns of non-
mammals, see generally ROGER FOUTS WITH STEPHEN TUKEL MILLS, NEXT OF KIN (1997) (de-
scribing the numerous ways in which chimpanzees resemble humans, including their ability to
learn and use human language and transmit it to their children). De Waal strikes a careful bal-
ance in recognizing that sex roles in bonobos reflect adaptations to environmental factors different
from those facing humans (and chimpanzees), see DE WAAL, supra, at 135, while acknowledging,
as Posner does not, that "the bonobo, by virtue of its close relation to us, is a critical piece in the
puzzle of human evolution," id. at 143. Judge Posner's errors concerning the hominoid lineage
could be easily overlooked, except that they occur in the middle of an argument that relies heavily
on evolutionary biology as the basis for calling into question humans' ability to engage in moral
reasoning. See Posner, Problematics, supra note i8o, at 1657-62; see also Dworkin, supra note
i5o, at 1734-38 (observing that evolutionary biology appears to be at the heart of Judge Posner's
normative views).
If so extraordinary a judge as Posner cannot avoid misapprehending important details of the
specialized fields with which he grapples, his claim that courts generally have great assimilative
powers must be an overstatement. For example, courts must from time to time address legal is-
sues involving human sexuality, but as Judge Posner notes, "judges know next to nothing about
[sex] beyond their own personal experience." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992).
To remedy the matter in his own case, Judge Posner acquainted himself with "a vast multidisci-
plinary literature on sex, a literature to which medicine, biology, sociobiology, psychiatry, psy-
chology, sociology, economics, jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, history, classics, anthropology,
demography - even geography and literary criticism - have all contributed." Id. at 2. I am not
qualified to judge whether Judge Posner has mastered this literature, but I dare say that most
judges and academics would fail at this or similar tasks. Cf Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism
in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1992) (arguing that legal scholars are often not
qualified to engage in useful interdisciplinary work).
279 See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 263 (1998); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102-19 (1985).
280 During the i99I Term, I was a law clerk to Justice Kennedy, whom Lazarus describes
(along with Justice O'Connor) as "susceptible to clerks' arguments," LAZARUS, supra note 2 79, at
274, by which he presumably means unduly susceptible. That was not my perception.
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government.28' The Justices' self-sufficiency is not, however, an en-
tirely good thing.
Even if one understands administrative agencies within the execu-
tive branch as performing a fundamentally political role, 2 2 they still
make extensive use of civil servant experts. Similarly, with the growth
in the role of the administrative state over the last century, Congress
has increasingly come to rely upon experts of its own to monitor the
agencies. Under the auspices of the Comptroller General, the United
States General Accounting Office (GAO) "conducts audits, surveys, in-
vestigations, and evaluations of federal programs ... at the request of
congressional committees or members, or to fulfill GAO specifically
mandated or basic legislative requirements. GAO's findings and rec-
ommendations are published as reports to congressional members or
delivered as testimony to congressional committees." 2 3
The Court has nothing comparable to the expert staff used by the
executive and legislative branches to inform its decisions. Each Justice
is entitled to the assistance of four law clerks who help draft opinions
and select cases for review. 28 4 In addition, the Court employs a small
professional staff of lawyers and other individuals who work in the of-
fices of the Clerk of Court, the Marshal, and in the Court library, as
well as other miscellaneous personnel, 28s but no staff charged with
finding facts.
It is unrealistic to suppose that the Court could or should utilize the
sort of bureaucratic factfinders and researchers associated with the
other branches of government. However, the Court could take some
small steps to improve its own access to empirical data. Much of the
Court's aversion to the use of empirical data stems from the reaction to
its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.286 In Brown, the Court
supplemented its basic argument with a footnote citing studies on the
psychological effects of racially segregated schools. 28 7 Even though the
footnote appeared to play a negligible role in the Court's decision,288 a
storm of protest over the study's methodology ensued,28 9 and the
281 Even if the Justices do less of their "own work" now than when Justice Brandeis attributed
public respect for the Court to this fact, see Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall and the Brethren,
80 GEo. L.J. 2109, 2110 (1992), they remain more involved in the details of their work than, for
example, a typical member of Congress.
282 See Strauss, supra note 244, at 760-77.
283 GAO Frequently Asked Questions (last modified June 26, I998) <http://www.gao.gov
Ifaqlfaq.htm#5.3>.
284 See 28 U.S.C. § 675 (1994); ELLEN GREENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT EXPLAINED 9
('997).
285 See GREENBERG, supra note 284, at 7-12.
286 347 U.S. 483 (I954).
287 See id. at 494 n.iI.
288 See Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 3o N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-67 (I955).
289 See Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases - A Reply
to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69 (I96O). See generally MICHAEL J. SAKS &
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Court has been exceedingly reluctant to utilize social science data ever
since.2 90 The Court needs to move beyond this overreaction.
How so? To begin, the Court could rely to a greater extent on em-
pirical and policy analysis in its written opinions. Doing so would
then encourage lead counsel and amici to include more such material
in their own presentations to the Court. In this respect, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Swidler & Berlin v. United
States29 1 is encouraging; it expressly signals the Court's willingness to
consider empirical evidence. 2 2 The Court needs to follow up on such
general invitations by citing empirical data submitted in party and
amicus briefs. In addition, the Court might profit from taking a less
passive role in directing the proceedings once it has granted a petition
for a writ of certiorari. Just as it sometimes requests that counsel brief
and argue particular legal questions,2 93 the Court could invite counsel
to address specific factual questions.
The Court could also increase its reliance on the sort of adjunct
fact gatherers familiar to other courts. Special masters are one exam-
ple.2 94  Under the Court's current practice, special masters are typi-
cally appointed for cases within the Court's original jurisdiction, 95 but
the Court does not use special masters or other neutral experts to assist
with the complex factual questions that arise in the exercise of its ap-
CHARLES H. BARON, THE USEINONUSEfIVIISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE
COURTS (I980) (discussing the ways in which social science research has been used and misused
by the courts); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 196o SUP. CT.
REv. 75 (explaining the role of facts in constitutional lawmaking). Paul Rosen has offered a de-
fense of the Brown Court's social science claims. See PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 134-72 (1972) (associating the Brown Court's use of social science with the
sociological jurisprudence urged by Brandeis, Cardozo, and Pound).
290 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 119-2o & n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticiz-
ing the Brown Court's reliance on social science data).
291 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2088 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of
the client (except in testamentary cases)).
292 The Court stated:
While the arguments against the survival of the privilege are by no means frivolous, they
are based in large part on speculation - thoughtful speculation, but speculation nonethe-
less - as to whether posthumous termination of the privilege would diminish a client's
willingness to confide in an attorney. In an area where empirical information would be
useful, it is scant and inconclusive.
Id. at 2o88; see also id. at 2o87 n.4 (rioting that "[elmpirical evidence on the privilege is limited.
Three studies do not reach firm conclusions on whether limiting the privilege would discourage
full and frank communication" (citing Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney Client
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191 (1989); Fred C. Zacharias, Re-
thinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351, 352 (1989); and Comment, Functional Overlap
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications
Doctrine, 7, YALE L.J. 1226 (1962))).
293 See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 30 0997); Bogan v. Scott-
Harris, I17 S. Ct. 2430 (I997).
294 See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 5 12, 520-21 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
the utility of special masters and other experts to trial courts).
295 See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 1726, 1731 0998).
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pellate jurisdiction, even when the trial court has not addressed the
relevant question. 296
Changes of this sort could be beneficial, but conceptual, institu-
tional, and practical difficulties are likely to limit the Court's ability to
narrow its information-gathering deficit. To put the matter in what
may seem tendentiously postmodern terms, at a conceptual level
"facts" are slippery; the kinds of facts that interest courts are inter-
twined with the reasons we care about them and the conceptual appa-
ratus we use to process them. Recall the Microsoft litigation discussed
briefly in the Introduction.297  A court without computer expertise
cannot hope to give an intelligent answer to the question whether an
operating system and an internet browser constitute an integrated
product or two distinct ones. But even a computer-savvy court an-
swering such a question must recognize that any resolution will neces-
sarily be temporary. Operating systems and browsers are not natural
kinds; their relation to one another depends upon the state of technol-
ogy at any given moment,2 98 as well as upon the reasons we have for
caring about product integration.
Thus, we come to the institutional difficulty: the Court cannot sim-
ply delegate the task of factfinding to special masters or other adjunct
entities, because the resolution of factual questions in the sense that
usually concerns us cannot be neatly separated from the articulation of
norms. Moreover, frequent delegation of the factfinding function to
special masters - or to expert bodies like science courts299 - would
be likely to expose rather than solve the Court's dilemma. To the ex-
tent that these bodies perform the work ordinarily associated with ad-
ministrative agencies, it is not clear why they should be located within
296 It is unclear whether the Court has the authority to appoint special masters in cases outside
its original jurisdiction. Even in original cases, "the scope of the Masters' authority is not always
clear," because "the Court's rules make no provision respecting the proceedings before a Master."
ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO & KENNETH S. GELLER,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 487 (7th ed. 1993). Supreme Court Rule 17.2 provides for the appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence in original
cases, see id. at 488 n.38, suggesting by negative implication that no evidence will be taken on
factual questions arising in cases within the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, even as to
original jurisdiction cases, the Court only takes evidence on questions of adjudicative rather than
legislative fact.
297 See supra pp. 12-13.
298 Only four years ago, operating systems and graphical user interfaces for IBM-compatible
personal computers were generally considered separate products. Cf. United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that Windows 3.11 and MS-DOS were under-
stood to be distinct products).
299 The possible use of such expert bodies was hotly debated in the 197os, especially among
judges of the D.C. Circuit, with its steady diet of complex scientific issues. See, e.g., David L.
Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 817, 826-29
(1977) (discussing science courts); Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role
of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 546-54 (1974) (discussing scientific experts and other aids);
Abraham D. Sofaer, The Science Court: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 ENVTL. L. 1 (1978).
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the judicial branch;300 to the extent that they perform judicial work,
they seem superfluous, if not illegitimate. 30 1 Hence, such adjunct fact-
finding bodies could not be used in more than a small fraction of the
Court's cases.
More fundamentally, courts should not attempt to remake them-
selves in the image of traditionally conceived administrative agencies,
with armies of fact gatherers answering to centralized policymakers.
That regulatory model is increasingly outdated because, as society has
become more complex, interdependent, and rapidly evolving, central-
ized and hierarchical organizations have become less adept at re-
sponding to social needs. For example, in the analogous context of the
private sector, firms have increasingly responded to the threat of eco-
nomic competition by shifting from hierarchical to decentralized struc-
tures.302  In place of vertical integration or fixed long-term contracts,
the emerging organizational forms rely on continuous information ex-
change and collaboration among economic actors as the primary
means of ensuring fidelity to common purposes. 30 3 Although their ul-
timate triumph is hardly guaranteed, these decentralized private sector
organizations possess considerable advantages that have led them to
spread throughout the world.30 4
The organizing principles of the "new economy" are not confined to
the private sector, partly because in an advanced economy no clear
line can be drawn between the private and public sectors. Indeed,
even during the heyday of mass production on the Taylorist model, 30 5
government regulatory agencies quite naturally tended to adopt the
same organizational structure as the entities they regulated.30 6 As the
organization of economic and other social activity has changed, some
of the most effective forms of government regulation of that activity
have begun to change with them. In the new regulatory model, citi-
zens and other interested constituencies participate directly in the for-
mulation of policy, regulators participate in the activities they regulate,
300 In the 192os, Cardozo proposed the creation of a Ministry of Justice to bridge the gap be-
tween courts and legislatures. It would have studied the law developed on a case-by-case basis
for problems that could be best cured by legislation. See Cardozo, supra note 229, at 114. Nota-
bly, the proposed ministry would not have played any role in the resolution of concrete cases. See
id. at 125.
301 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. I, 56-57 (1979).
302 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 292-314.
303 See id.
304 See id. at 3o6-07.
305 See generally FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1967) (propounding a model of industrial organization in which managers require workers to per-
form standardized tasks with little room for discretion or creativity).
306 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-13 (1938) (comparing an ad-
ministrative agency to an industry-wide board of directors); MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F.
SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 73-104 (1984).
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and transparency serves to limit the opportunities for agency capture
and self-dealing. 30 7 For example, state and federal environmental
regulation in the last decade has moved away from command-and-
control strategies and toward flexible ones that combine the freedom to
innovate with an obligation to collect and make available information
that facilitates comparisons of the strengths and weaknesses of differ-
ent approaches. 308 Similar innovations in areas as diverse as family
support services,30 9 community policing,310 and nuclear power plant
safety,3 11 as well as historical antecedents in forestry,312 military pro-
curement, 313 and public health,314 provide evidence of the widespread
adaptability of regulation by loosely coordinated decentralization.
Thus, increasingly, agencies do not use social science in the way
that Judge Posner and its other champions315 suggest that courts
should - to find definitive answers to empirical and policy questions.
Instead, innovative regulators set temporary standards based upon the
best practice to emerge from regulated actors in communication with
one another. For example, rather than specifying a particular safe
method of production (or shipment, or storage, or disposal) of a haz-
ardous material, agencies using the new model require the use of a
method as safe as some industry standard, which is itself subject to
change with changing conditions and improving technology.316
The emerging methods of regulation just described currently co-
exist with more traditional means of command-and-control regulation
at the state and federal level. Charles Sable and I have recently ar-
gued elsewhere that in order for the decentralized methods to take
hold, they must operate as part of a national system that we call
"democratic experimentalism. 317  Within such a system, the courts
would play the vital role of enforcing the rights of individuals to par-
307 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 380 (describing a "peer inspectorate").
308 See id. at 373-88 (describing, inter alia, the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act of
1989, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21 I, § io (West 1996) and the federal Environmental Protection
Agency's Common Sense Initiative and Project XL); see also DANIEL C. ESTY & MARIAN R.
CHERTOW, Thinking Ecologically: An Introduction, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY I, 11-13
(i997) ("The shift away from the polarities of the past several decades toward a policymaking
model that attends to interconnectedness demands new tools and strategies.).
309 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 324-27.
310 See id. at 327-32.
311 See id. at 371-73. Note, however, that the experience of the Institute of Nuclear Power Op-
erations (INPO) differs from that of the entities involved in regulating the other fields mentioned
in the text in that INPO is nominally private and "its reports are not directly available to the
public." Id. at 372-73.
312 See id. at 364-7I.
313 See id. at 332-36.
314 See id. at 416-17 n.468.
315 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Em-
pirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 548-49 (i99i).
316 See Doff & Sabel, supra note 17, at 350-54 (describing "rolling best-practice rule[making").
317 Id. at 336-39 (describing the limitations of piecemeal efforts).
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ticipate in state and local bodies that implement broad congressional
mandates. 3 18 Courts would do so by weighing the reasons given by
government for challenged conduct against information derived from
experience in other jurisdictions. 3 19 The emerging pattern of admini-
stration therefore has the potential to bring about important changes
in the Court's methodology.
However, for the time being, the new model of fact-gathering and
policymaking is not readily assimilable to the questions the Supreme
Court faces. To be sure, trial courts - particularly specialized ones -
have the capability to act as coordinators of social learning and serv-
ices, receiving input directly from the parties affected, and thereby op-
erating in ways that are broadly similar to innovative agencies. 32 0
However, the sheer number and variety of cases that come before the
Supreme Court make a unilateral transformation of its method of in-
teracting with society along these lines essentially impossible. The
Court sits atop a hierarchical organization, or to be more precise, fifty-
one hierarchical organizations - the lower federal courts and (with re-
spect to their decisions on questions of federal law) the state courts.
For it to benefit from the pooling of decentralized learning, therefore,
the Court must enlist the aid of actors closer to the ground.
B. Provisional Adjudication
This Section discusses some doctrinal mechanisms for implement-
ing decentralization in the absence of a large-scale reconceptualization
of government and politics. Each of the proposed changes will un-
doubtedly raise a host of practical questions that I do not attempt to
answer in any detail - although the next section briefly explains how
what I call "provisional adjudication" can be considered an extension,
rather than a rejection, of common understandings of adjudication.
Within existing frameworks, the constitutional doctrine of federal-
ism is the most natural starting point for a model of decentralized
learning. Justice Brandeis's metaphor of the states as experimental
"laboratories '321 captures the basic concept. Because states are smaller
than the nation as a whole, the costs associated with a failed regula-
tory policy at the state level are smaller than they would be at the fed-
eral level. 322 Further, because states can experiment simultaneously
318 See id. at 388-90.
319 See id. at 395-404.
320 See id. at 401-02 (discussing drug courts). For a positive appraisal of the experience of non-
specialist trial courts in supervising prison reform, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998).
321 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-Ii (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
322 For arguments sympathetic to the "laboratory" model, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85-88 (1995); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1485, 1499 (1994); and Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' De-
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with many approaches to similar problems, learning proceeds more
rapidly than when such approaches are attempted seriatim.323
Yet the Court's federalism doctrines implement the notion of states
as experimental laboratories imperfectly at best. In its recent decisions
protecting state sovereignty on the basis of the Commerce Clause, 324
the Tenth Amendment,3 25 and the Eleventh Amendment,326 the Court
appears to be much more concerned about preserving the dignity of
the states - as if they were natural persons that could experience hurt
feelings beyond those of their residents327 - than in pursuing decen-
tralization and the other policy goals that federalism serves.328
Consider the Court's recently discovered "anticommandeering"
principle, which prohibits the federal government from requiring a
state legislature to enact legislation 29 or ordering a state executive to
enforce a federal regulatory program. 330 At least one version of com-
mandeering seems to take advantage of decentralized learning in just
the ways envisioned by the experimental laboratories metaphor. In
this approach, the federal government gives the states broadly defined
mandates to implement within similarly broadly defined limits, and
federal agencies serve primarily as a means of facilitating information
exchange among states and localities. Yet the current doctrine's focus
on the states' dignity33 ' might render such mandates unconstitutional
sign, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1484, 1498-15o (1987). For a more skeptical view, see Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
593 (i98o). For a response to Rose-Ackerman's skepticism, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federal-
ism, 82 MnN. L. REv. 317, 397-400 ('997).
323 See SHAPimo, supra note 322, at 85; Friedman, supra note 322, at 400.
324 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
325 See Printz v. United States, ii7 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
326 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996). The Court has resisted the most ex-
pansive view of the limits placed on the jurisdiction of the federal courts by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, ii8 S. Ct. 2047, 2054 (1998) (hold-
ing that an otherwise removable case can be removed to federal court notwithstanding the inclu-
sion of claims subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar).
327 See Monaghan, supra note ig, at 132.
328 See Dorf, supra note ig, at 831-34. It has been argued that all of the goals of federalism
could be accomplished by a unitary national government that decentralized decisionmaking as
appropriate. See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 951 (1994) (arguing that federalism serves no policy
objectives that are not equally or better served by decentralization). Although I am sympathetic
to this perspective, it seems at most an ideal model rather than a blueprint, given the role states in
fact play in our system of government. See Friedman, supra note 322, at 381-82; see also id. at
386-405 (describing values served better by federalism than by mere decentralization); Vicki C.
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, iii HARV. L. REV.
218o, 2217 (1998) ("Rubin and Feeley's analysis falis to appreciate the degree to which decentrali-
zation in the United States is a function of, and bound up with, federalism .. .
329 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. i44, i75 (1992).
330 See Printz, 117 S. CL at 2376-78.
331 The Court does provide a functional justification for the anticommandeering doctrine: it
claims that federal mandates to state legislatures will blur the lines of accountability. See New
York, 5o5 U.S. at i69. On its own, the claim provides a weak basis for the Court's rule, and in
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as long as state participation in the federal program is a formal re-
quirement.332 In this way, federalism doctrine not only fails to encour-
age experimentalism, but also stands as an affirmative obstacle to it.
Moreover, the Court's invocation of the states' role as experimental
laboratories often appears to be a makeweight. Consider the Court's
recent decisions denying recognition to an asserted constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide.333  Although the Chief Justice's opinion
was nominally for the Court, five Justices suggested a willingness to
consider recognizing in some future case that, as Justice O'Connor put
it, a "mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering
has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circum-
stances of his or her imminent death. '334  Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer joined in Justice O'Connor's analysis.335  Justices Stevens and
Souter would have gone even farther down the road toward recogniz-
ing the right.336
The Court's reasoning must, therefore, be read in light of Justice
O'Connor's qualifications, and for her it was critical that the "labora-
tory of the States" be given the opportunity to create procedural safe-
guards for balancing "the interests of terminally ill, mentally compe-
tent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the State's
interests in protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or
under pressure. '337  The theme of federalism was prominent in all of
the opinions. At the time the cases were decided, it appeared that no
any event, does not distinguish commandeering legislation from other programs of federal/state
cooperation that have the same potential for undermining accountability. See Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Im-
plement Federal Law?, 9s COLUM. L. REV. IOO1, io61-72 (995); Friedman, supra note 322, at
396-97; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 824-30 199 8 ).
Hills provides an alternative, functional justification for the Court's anticommandeering doctrine,
arguing that commandeering is less efficient than voluntary intergovernmental undertakings. See
id. at 87--9o. I am dubious that such voluntary arrangements will always be sufficient to foster
the kind of experimentalism that I advocate.
332 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 423-32.
333 See Vacco v. Quill, i7 S. Ct. 2293 (997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997). I was one of two lawyers who filed the amicus brief on behalf of state legislators and also
provided the lead counsel for the respondents with some assistance in the preparation of their
briefs and oral arguments. See Brief Amicus Curiae of State Legislators in Support of Respon-
dents, Quill and Glucksberg (Nos. 95-1858 and 96-I 1O).
334 Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
335 Although Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion of the Court, Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer only concurred in the judgment, while nonetheless endorsing Justice O'Connor's views.
See id. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in the judgments); id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg-
ments). This suggests that Justice O'Connor joined the opinion of the Court for the purpose of
ensuring that the Court would speak with one voice, even though the effect appears to be rather
the opposite.
336 See id. at 2304-10 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments); Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, at
2275-93 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
337 Glucksberg and Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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American jurisdiction permitted physician-assisted suicide, 338 and
some of the Justices therefore believed they lacked the information
necessary to resolve the issue. As Justice Souter explained, "[tihe day
may come when we can say with some assurance which side is right,
but for now it is the substantiality of the factual disagreement, and the
alternatives for resolving it, that matter.1339  Even Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion found it significant that "the States are currently
engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted sui-
cide and other similar issues."340
It is thus reasonable to suppose that the possibility of state experi-
mentation was a critical factor in the Court's rejection of the right as-
serted in the physician-assisted suicide cases.341 What would be the
doctrinal consequence if afederal statute were to impose a nationwide
ban on physician-assisted suicide by lethal prescription, as various
members of Congress have lately proposed?3 42  Even though such a
law would effectively eliminate the possibility of experimentation by
the states, the law would be valid so long as it met the ordinary tests
for constitutionality under Congress's affirmative powers - here the
Commerce Clause. This incongruity results from the near-complete
separation between the jurisprudence of congressional power and the
jurisprudence of individual rights.343
It was not always thus. As the Federalists argued, the original
1787 Constitution relied on the interrelationship between rights and
powers as the principal means of protecting liberty; this, in their view,
obviated the need for a bill of rights.344 Although the Federalists con-
338 Physician-assisted suicide was legal in Oregon, but the law authorizing it was, at the time,
not in effect because of a court order. For an account of the Oregon ballot initiative and subse-
quent legal challenges, see Patrick M. Curran, Jr., Regulating Death: Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act and the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 86 GEo. L.J. 725 (1998). See also Lee v.
Oregon, 107 F.3d X382, 1386-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, IS S. Ct. 328 (1997).
339 Glucksberg, z7 S. Ct. at 2292 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
340 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267.
341 Even if one were to disagree with my analysis of these particular cases, the point could be
assumed arguendo, because there certainly will be some case in which this argument makes a dif-
ference, and nothing turns on the subject matter of the case.
342 Attorney General Janet Reno overruled a policy statement, issued in November 1997 by
Thomas A. Constantine of the Drug Enforcement Administration, which asserted that existing
federal drug trafficking laws barred physician-assisted suicide by lethal prescription. See Neil A.
Lewis, Reno Lifts Barrier to Oregon's Law on Aided Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1998, at Ai.
Some members of Congress have proposed legislation endorsing Mr. Constantine's view. See S.
2151, 1o5th Cong. (1998); H.R1 4006, Io5th Cong. (1998).
343 Of course, even without an express connection between structural and rights jurisprudence,
"the actual allocation among various governmental actors of the power to restrict liberty is an
important aspect of the overall dynamics of a system of civil liberties." Henry P. Monaghan,
Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 296, 308--09 (198o).
344 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 531 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., ig6I); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 2788), in THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 367, 369 (Michael Kammen ed., 2986); James Wil-
son, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 2787), in FEDERALISTS AND
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ceded the argument over the Bill of Rights during the ratification
struggle, 345 early jurisprudence continued to recognize what today
could be considered external limits on affirmative powers, as when the
Court noted in McCulloch v. Maryland346 that although Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce is broad, it may not be used
pretextually.3 47
Modern Commerce Clause doctrine rejects the requirement that
Congress be motivated by commercial purposes,348 and I would not
advocate a return to the older view. 349 Nevertheless, the Court is
searching for ways to limit federal power under the Commerce Clause
in favor of state power. In United States v. Lopez, 35 0 the Court in-
voked the states' traditional dominion over education and punishment
of crimes of violence as one of the reasons to invalidate a federal stat-
ute prohibiting firearm possession in the vicinity of a schoolyard.
s5
However, given the Court's unhappy experience with the traditional
state functions test as a Tenth Amendment limit on Congress's
power,35 2 there is reason to doubt the test's utility as an internal limit
under the Commerce Clause. In these circumstances, the Court might
turn to its rights jurisprudence as a supplement to its federalism juris-
prudence. When, as in the physician-assisted suicide cases, the possi-
bility of experimentation by the states plays a substantial role in the
provisional decision to deny recognition to a right, the Court ought to
limit the federal government's ability to adopt a uniform national solu-
tion before there has been a substantial period for experimentation. In
ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 166, 167
(John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969) (describing the Federalists' view that a
bill of rights was unnecessary and the Antifederalists' contrary view).
345 See Dorf, supra note 272, at 1187 n.5o (citing Michael A. Gillespie, Massachusetts: Creating
Consensus, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 138, 154-58 (Michael A. Gillespie & Michael
Lienesch eds., 1989); John P. Kaminski, The Constitution Without a Bill of Rights, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
LIBERTIES 16, 33-39 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992); and Jean Yarbrough,
New Hampshire Puritanism and the Moral Foundations of America, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra, at 235, 250-5 I).
346 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
347 See id. at 423; see also Lessig, supra note 245, at 448.
348 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
349 But cf Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 788-89 (1997)
(urging that Congress be presumed to luck the power to infringe "liberty interests").
350 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
351 See id. at 564; id. at 580-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
352 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985). Lopez is not
the only case in tension with Garcia's rejection of the traditional state function test. As a matter
of statutory construction, the Court requires a plain statement by Congress in order to interfere
with a traditional and essential state function. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey,
I18 S. Ct. 1952, 1954 (1998) (assuming arguendo that the operation of a state prison is such a
function (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 5O U.S. 452 (1991))).
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this way, individual rights would inform federalism, and, in close
cases, federalism would inform individual rights.
Using the states as experimental laboratories - both in the conven-
tional sense and in the innovative sense of tying limits on enumerated
powers to rights jurisprudence as just suggested above - would assist
the Court only when the Court's doctrines permit different jurisdic-
tions to take varied approaches to common problems. 35 3 Since Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee,354 however, the Supreme Court has seen its role as
principally one of promoting uniformity in the interpretation of federal
law.3-5  For example, an important criterion for deciding whether the
Court will grant a petition for a writ of certiorari is whether the lower
federal courts or state courts of last resort have issued conflicting rul-
ings.35
6
Notwithstanding this vision of the Court's role, "temporary disuni-
formity of federal law can assist the Court in learning from experience.
The Court sometimes defers decision on a relatively novel question of
federal law so that the issue can "percolate" in the state and lower fed-
eral courts.357 Rather than decide such issues immediately, the Court
hopes to address them with the benefit of well-reasoned opinions by
the federal courts of appeals and perhaps the state courts of last resort.
To this justification should be added the possibility that the passage of
time during which there is a circuit split creates a record of the conse-
quences of different legal regimes.358 A trend toward allowing greater
353 Absent diverse practices among the states, comparisons with other national systems may
prove helpful. One must always be careful not to draw overly broad conclusions based on differ-
ent national conditions, but similar caution applies to discussions of domestic experience as well.
Certainly Justice Scalia's open hostility to comparative law, see Printz v. United States, I17 S. Ct.
2365, 2377 n.xi (1997) (contending that "comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of in-
terpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one"), seems
unwarranted.
354 14 U.S. (i Wheat.) 304 (i16).
355 See id. at 347-48.
356 See Sup. CT. R. io(a)--(b).
357 See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23-24 n.i (1995) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 961-63 (x983) (Stevens, J., respecting de-
nial of petitions for writs of certiorari)).
358 During the debate over a proposed national court of appeals in the 197os and early i98os,
some commentators endorsed percolation as a means of experimentation. See Charles L. Black,
Jr., The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L.J. 883, 898 (1974) ('Many
[circuit splits] can be endured and sometimes perhaps ought to be endured while judges and
scholars observe the respective workings out in practice of the conflicting rules, particularly
where the question of law is a close one, to which confident answer will in any case be impossi-
ble."); Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Respon-
sibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 68i, 716 (1984) ("The process of percolation
allows a period of exploratory consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the Su-
preme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule."); John Paul Stevens, Some
Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 183 (1982) ("[E]xperience with conflicting
interpretations of federal rules may help to illuminate an issue before it is finally resolved and
thus may play a constructive role in the lawmaking process."). It is not entirely clear from the
quoted language whether the experimentation these commentators envisioned would have con-
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percolation may already be under way; the decline in the Court's
caseload over the last five years is undoubtedly due in part to the re-
tirement of Justice White, who was a strong believer in granting cer-
tiorari to enforce the uniformity of federal law.359
There are, to be sure, many circumstances in which the uniformity
of federal law should be paramount. In some instances, the very rea-
son for federal, as opposed to state, regulation is to relieve interstate
businesses of the burden of complying with fifty different regulatory
regimes. Moreover, with respect to some controversial matters of indi-
vidual rights, a uniform national regime is critically important to the
Court's credibility.360 Similarly, concerns about equality and fair no-
tice would tip the scales in favor of uniformity in the definition of
criminal offenses. And of course, balanced against the learning facili-
tated in each case by temporary disuniformity are the costs that may
accompany legal uncertainty, including unprotected reliance, inability
to plan, and excessive litigation.36 1 Hence, percolation will frequently
not be worth the cost.362 This is not to say, however, that percolation
would never be justified.
sisted of doctrinal innovation, the sort of direct assessment of consequences of different legal re-
gimes advanced here, or both.
359 See Michael J. Broyde, Note, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analy-
sis of Justice White's Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
61o, 611-13 (1987). Thus, allowing percolation may be one of the Court's responses to caseload
pressure. See Peter L. Strauss, One Handred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Su-
preme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
Iiog-I6 (1987) (arguing that given docket pressure, percolation makes a virtue of necessity). For
an analysis of the multifarious causes of the shrinking docket, see Arthur D. Hellman, The
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 403. Hellman notes that the Su-
preme Court typically pays inadequate attention to developments in the lower federal courts, al-
though, due to their much larger caseload, they often have greater experience. See id. at 436; su-
pra pp. 21-22 (noting Justice Ginsburg's willingness to draw upon the experience of the lower
federal courts in construing a federal statute).
360 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-69 (1992); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, i8 (1958) (stating that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 37 (I8O3), "declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a perma-
nent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system").
361 See Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 69o
(1990).
362 Congress makes this judgment whenever it provides for mandatory expedited review by the
Supreme Court. See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, io Stat. 1200 (1996) (expedited
review codified at 2 U.S.C. § 692 (i99)); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 561(b), I IO Stat. 142 (providing for expedited appellate review to Supreme Court); Cable Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385 (expedited review codified at 47 U.S.C. § 555(c)(2) (I994)). However,
expedited review can lead to a rush to judgment. See Felker v. Turpin, 517 U.S. 1182, 1183
(1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mark Tushnet, "The King of France with Forty Thousand Men":
Felker v. Turpin and the Supreme Court's Deliberative Processes, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 163, 163-
66.
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Even if one concedes that percolation occasionally makes practical
sense, one might object to the practice as unprincipled.363 According
to this view, the Court has no business imposing (or acquiescing in the
imposition of) what is, after all, an incorrect view of the law on some
of those litigants whose cases are decided while a legal question is per-
colating. For example, suppose that the Court had allowed greater
percolation with respect to the abortion issue: "the states would have
been free to experiment with different approaches to the abortion
question and eventually an answer might have emerged that would
have commended itself to the Court, and the nation, as both principled
and practical. '364 It may seem a decisive objection to this idea that
"many thousands of young women's lives [would have been] ruined in
the meantime, while the 'experiments' were being conducted, by what
the Court might later declare, when it deemed the 'experiment' to
have lasted long enough, had been a violation of their constitutional
rights."365
Although there may be sound reasons for the Court to have re-
jected a period of experimentalism regarding the abortion issue, this
last objection is not among them. When the resolution of a legal issue
will inflict harm on one group (women, in the abortion example) if it is
resolved one way, and another group (fetuses, to continue the present
example) if resolved the other way, the risk of erroneous decision is
great no matter what one decides. 366 Especially if one believes there
are right answers in hard cases - or even if one merely rejects the
crude form of legal realism that regards any decision of a court of last
resort as correct by virtue of the court's having so decided - the pos-
sibility of error provides a reason to try as hard as possible to make
the correct decision. In order to reduce the risk of the larger harm that
would result from selecting a legal regime for the entire nation too
quickly, the court may choose to permit the temporary coexistence of
inconsistent legal regimes, knowing that at least one of them will later
be deemed illegal.
Deontologists might object that this last claim amounts to an inco-
herent consequentialism of rights - the view that one should maxi-
mize the number of occasions on which we respect non-
consequentialist rights, even if that means violating rights from time to
time. That objection assumes, however, that we know what rights
there are. Experimentalism addresses situations in which we do not.
363 This point need not, however, be phrased as an objection. See Bickel, supra note 40, at 51
(contrasting principle with prudence, rather than whim). But see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REv. i, 1 (I964).
364 Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal "Theory":" A Response to Ronald Dworkin, 29
ARiz. ST. L.J. 377, 386 (i997).
365 Ronald Dworkin, Reply, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 431, 437 (1997).
366 See Posner, Problematics, supra note i8o, at 1703.
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In constructing a model of provisional adjudication, we might also
turn to the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges to
statutes and other government policies. In recent years, the Court has
divided over the circumstances under which a litigant may challenge a
government policy on its face.3 67 As understood within the terms of
this debate, the distinction raises issues closely related to questions of
third-party standing.368  The doctrine distinguishes between facial
claims in which the claimant's own conduct is irrelevant because the
challenged rule of law is invalid,369 and as-applied claims in which the
claimant concedes the general validity of the rule, but claims that its
application to her conduct violates her legal rights.37 0 Other things
being equal, even those who take a relatively liberal attitude toward
facial challenges prefer to resolve cases in a narrower, as-applied pos-
ture, because focusing on the actual facts of the case will look less like
abstract review that borders on an advisory opinion, and more like the
resolution of a straightforward case or controversy.3 71
For similar reasons, the Court may believe that it is better to defer
judgment about the meaning or validity of a statute or policy until
there has been some substantial period of experience under it. Allow-
ing percolation of this sort, however, may not always be feasible or de-
sirable because circumstances may require the Court to provide an an-
swer before it wishes. In such cases, it would be appropriate for the
Court to place a heavy burden on the party seeking to foreclose ex-
perimentation.37 2 Just as rejecting a facial challenge (in the conven-
tional, third-party standing sense) does not preclude a party from
bringing an as-applied challenge in a later case, 37 3 rejecting a challenge
to some statute or policy early in its life should not preclude a party
367 See Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2304, 2304 (I997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgments) (citing the exchange of views in Janklow v. Planned Parenthood,
517 U.S. 1174, 1175-76 (1996)); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997). Justice
Stevens has come close to endorsing my view. See Glucksberg and Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2304 n.6
(citing Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235,
239-40 (99)); Glucksberg and Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments);
Janklow, 517 U.S. at I 175 (mem. of Stevens, J.) (citing Dorf, supra, at 236, 238).
368 See Dorf, supra note 367, at 263; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, oo
YALE L.J. 853, 867-75 (991). See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984) (describing the problematic development of the third-party standing
doctrine and proposing clarifications and modifications of the doctrine).
369 See City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 118 S. Ct. 523, 531 (1997) (noting
that a party bringing a facial constitutional claim is not bound by the administrative record).
370 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5io U.S. 1309, 1313 0994) (Souter, Circuit Justice, in
chambers). But see Matthew Adler, Rights Against Rules, 97 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998)
(arguing that as-applied challenges do not exist).
371 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U S. 397, 403 n.3 (1989).
372 For a suggestion along these lines, see Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2292-93 (Souter, J., con-
curring), which raised the possibility of provisionally denying recognition to an asserted right -
in that case, physician-assisted suicide -- in order to allow legislative experimentation.
373 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 321 (1989).
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from bringing a later challenge based on what has been learned from
experience.37 4 A decision that a statute in operation for some substan-
tial period forbids some practice - based on lessons learned during
the statute's operation - would thus be consistent with a decision
permitting that practice shortly after the statute's enactment, just as a
successful as-applied challenge is consistent with an earlier, unsuccess-
ful facial one.375
C. Practical Considerations
How would provisional adjudication work in practice? Two mod-
els provide guidance. Consider first the concept of "constitutional re-
mand," advocated most forcefully by Judge Calabresi.376  Under this
approach, when an old law presents the possibility of a conflict with
constitutional rights, the courts should hesitate to invalidate the law on
constitutional grounds. Instead, they may "remand" to the legislature
for a determination regarding whether the law continues to reflect
public policy. If the legislature does not reenact the law, the court
need not decide the constitutional issue. Under Judge Calabresi's ap-
proach, if the legislature does reenact the law, the court should then be
reluctant to invalidate it.
Judge Calabresi's model of constitutional remand serves several
functions. First, as a substantive constitutional doctrine of desuetude,
it protects against prosecutions of persons who lack fair notice of the
374 Dissenting in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, x18 S. Ct. 2168 (igg8), Justice
Souter contended that there was no reason to wait for an as-applied challenge to the federal stat-
ute requiring the National Endowment for the Arts to consider "general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public," 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(i), when
granting awards, because illicit viewpoint discrimination would not be apparent in any particular
NEA decision. See Finley, ix8 S. Ct. at 2193 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, the conventional ba-
sis for preferring as-applied challenges - that they present an informative, concrete, factual set-
ting - did not apply. Note, however, that subsequent experience under the statute could reveal a
pattern of NEA decisionmaking that bespeaks viewpoint discrimination, which would be power-
ful evidence that the risks Justice Souter identified had come to pass. Of course, the Court would
then have to be willing to recognize the value of statistical evidence, which it has thus far been
reluctant to do. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-97 (1987).
375 Justice Breyer hinted at such a possibility in his dissent in Clinton v. City of New York, 118
S. Ct. 2091 (1998). He stated that he would uphold the "experiment" of the Line Item Veto Act,
see id. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting), suggesting that experience under the Act would reveal
whether it actually posed a threat to the balance of power struck by Article I. Although such ef-
fects might seem difficult to measure, some commentators have drawn important lessons from
states' use of similar mechanisms. See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS 31-41
(1996).
376 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 726, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd 117
S. Ct. 2293 (1997); GUIDO CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 146-49
(1982). Judge Calabresi developed the concept of constitutional remand proposed originally in
Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3G-35 (1957).
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wrongfulness of their conduct.377 Second, as a principle of judicial re-
straint, it enables courts to avoid invalidating legislative acts in the
event that the legislature chooses not to reenact the remanded policy.
Quite apart from these functions, the constitutional remand can serve
as a model for implementing a third purpose: the establishment of par-
tial and temporary judicial norms. If the legislature reenacts the chal-
lenged law after a constitutional remand, the court, in Judge
Calabresi's view, ought to consider that fact a reason to uphold the
law. Between remand and the judicial rehearing, a kind of learning
occurs: the legislature's reenactment of the challenged law measures
(albeit imperfectly) social support for the challenged policy.
Of course, the degree to which the public supports a law is only
one factor bearing on adjudication. In constitutional law, even a law
that is reenacted after a remand to the legislature may be invalid.
Further, in many instances it will be perfectly obvious at the outset of
litigation that a challenged policy enjoys widespread public support.
In such cases, a remand of the sort Judge Calabresi envisions would
serve no useful purpose. We. might generalize the concept of constitu-
tional remand beyond constitutional cases involving desuetude claims
to the broader category of cases in which the judicial selection of an
appropriate legal rule turns on the question of how various legal re-
gimes will work in practice. -.71
The second model for provisional adjudication is the notion, fa-
miliar from cases involving the constitutional rights of criminal sus-
pects, of "prophylactic rules." In the earlier discussion of Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,3 7 9 I noted that the Court's as-
sessment of whether the exclusionary rule applies to parole violation
hearings turned on whether such application would deter illegal police
conduct.380 Under the Court's precedents, the Fourth Amendment
does not by itself confer on criminal defendants a right to have rele-
vant but illegally seized evidence excluded from subsequent proceed-
ings. Instead, the Court justifies the exclusionary rule on prudential
grounds, as a deterrent to police violations of the Fourth Amendment.
The rule applies when, in the Court's judgment, the deterrence bene-
fits of exclusion outweigh the costs of losing reliable evidence.
381
377 The West Virginia courts apply a doctrine of desuetude expressly rooted in this concern.
See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720, 724-26 (W. Va. 1992).
378 The Court's antitrust doctrine provides a useful example. In deciding whether to adhere to
stare decisis, the Court acknowledges "a competing interest, well-represented in [its] decisions, in
recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience."
State Oil Co. v. Khan, r IS S. Ct. 275, 284 (1998) (overruling an earlier decision that treated verti-
cally imposed maximum prices as per se illegal).
379 i8 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
380 See supra p. 42.
381 See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019-20 (1998);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-88 (976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
I998] THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD 71
Similarly, the Court has held that, although failure to inform a suspect
held in custody of his rights to silence and an attorney does not itself
violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compulsory testimony,
as a prophylactic measure, the prosecution is barred from using a de-
fendant's statement in its case-in-chief absent the now-familiar
Miranda warnings. 38 2 Under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
the Court has formulated legal principles designed to protect constitu-
tional values while acknowledging that these principles do not flow di-
rectly from the Constitution.
Although critics have questioned the legitimacy of the Court's prac-
tice of imposing prophylactic rules, 38 3 those questions derive whatever
force they have from textualist assumptions. There is no substantive
difference between saying, on the one hand, that even though the lit-
eral text of the Constitution or a statute permits a practice, the Court
will "interpret" that text as prohibiting the practice, and, on the other
hand, conceding that the Court has imposed a prophylactic rule that
goes beyond what the authoritative text itself actually requires. The
distinction is entirely one of nomenclature, which is why David Strauss
quite accurately notes that in a substantive sense, prophylactic rules
are ubiquitous in the law.384 Doctrines such as the presumptive inva-
lidity of content-based restrictions of speech or the tiers-of-scrutiny
approach to equal protection could be readily conceived as mere pro-
phylactic measures designed to protect the underlying constitutional
values.385
Yet perhaps nomenclature matters. So long as the Court conceives
of its role as finding the meaning of constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, the notion of experimentation and provisional adjudication will
be tinged with illegitimacy. How can states be authorized to violate
the Constitution? How can a federal statute mean one thing in the
states comprising the First Circuit and something else in the states
382 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 61g, 647 (1093) (White, J., dissenting); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-57 (i966).
383 See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article
III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 124-56 (i985); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court,
z974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. I, 21-23 (1975); Martin
H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institu-
tionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 768-83 (1989). Other commentators are more sym-
pathetic to the federal courts' formulation of doctrine that is not specifically authorized by statute
or the Constitution. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1777-91 (igi); Martha A.
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 881 (1986); Daniel
J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and De-
fendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 287-95 (1988).
384 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cin. L. REv. 19o, 195
(1988).
385 See id. at 200 (speech); id. at 204-07 (equal protection). See generally Fallon, supra note 21
(arguing that detailed constitutional doctrine should be understood as an implementation, rather
than an interpretation, of the Constitution).
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comprising the Second Circuit? And how can the Constitution or a
federal law mean X at one time and Y some years later? To under-
stand adjudication as a quest for meaning is to privilege static concep-
tions of the judicial enterprise.
In contrast, understanding adjudication in prophylactic terms
opens up possibilities for experimentation. Thus, in Miranda, the
Court did not frame the requirement of warnings as a once-and-for-all-
time rule. Instead, the Court expressly invited Congress and the states
to devise "other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence. '38 6 As it turned out, neither
Congress nor the states have seriously attempted to come up with a
more effective alternative to Miranda (or the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule),38 7 but that result was hardly foreordained. Were the
Court to create conditions favorable to experimentation - such as
providing states and other jurisdictions with reasonably secure guaran-
tees that good faith experiments will not lead to retroactive liability in
the event they ultimately fail 388 - innovations consistent with broadly
understood federal norms would be likely to flourish.38 9
Ironically, however, the recognition of the ubiquity of prophylactic
rules may undermine the very notion of prophylaxis, which implies the
existence of "core" or "real" legal requirements that exist beneath the
prophylactic layer. If all or most federal doctrine is prophylactic, only
the bare constitutional or statutory text would appear to be real.
Given the relatively modest role that text plays and should play in the
resolution of Supreme Court cases, we are left with a small core of real
(as opposed to prophylactic) legal norms. Thus, reflecting on the large
role of doctrinal prophylaxis may lead us, by a seeming paradox, to
discard the dichotomy of core versus prophylactic norms. 390
But if this maneuver solves one conceptual difficulty, it also creates
a more serious one. Once courts recognize all doctrine to be, in some
sense, optional, adjudication loses its capacity to perform the settle-
ment function. Now the formalist can justifiably complain that we
have simply discarded the rule of law in favor of a flexibility bordering
on chaos.
This critique suggests that we should not give up too quickly on
the concept of prophylaxis. For even if there is no deep metaphysical
distinction between core and periphery, in any given epoch there will
continue to be important distinctions between what is contestable and
386 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
387 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 459-62.
388 See id. at 463-64.
389 Cf. Friedman, supra note 322, at 399-400 (describing the leading role of the states in legisla-
tive innovation).
390 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 458-59.
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what is not.39 1 A court could recognize as much without affirming
Platonic essences.
To be concrete, the Court could expressly designate some of its de-
cisions - or to be more precise, some portion of the legal norm an-
nounced in any given case - as subject to experiment, in much the
same way that it did in Miranda. It could also designate some doc-
trines or decisions as provisional, promising to revisit these matters at
some future date. Such a designation could be accompanied by a pro-
hibition of or invitation to experimentation, as the Court deemed ap-
propriate.
Moreover, such prohibitions or invitations could be addressee-
specific. To implement the sort of rights-centered federalism discussed
above,3 92 for example, a decision provisionally denying recognition of a
right to the aid of physicians in dying would permit states to legislate
broadly, but restrict federal legislation on the subject to such matters
as adopting policies for federal enclaves; Congress would be denied the
power to preempt state law or to use the spending power to coerce
states to adopt a uniform national policy.393
Finally, the designation of particular decisions or parts thereof as
subject to experimentation (or not) would require the Court to adopt a
default for cases in which no such designation accompanied a decision.
The doctrine of stare decisis seems to be an appropriate default. Un-
der current law, the overruling of a past decision requires something
beyond a mere change of mind or personnel. In cases in which the
Court's legitimacy is at stake, something beyond even the usual factors
may be required. As the Court explained in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,394 a dramatic change in the facts or the perception of facts un-
derlying the earlier ruling may qualify.395 Because such changes in re-
ality and perceptions are an increasingly common feature of our age,
adhering to the current understanding of stare decisis should entail an
increasing willingness to overrule past decisions. Thus, as I envision
it, expressly provisional adjudication would be set against a back-
ground that is itself quite dynamic.
391 See Lessig, supra note 147, at 1842-46.
392 See supra pp. 62-65. Neal Katyal has recently proposed linking rights and federalism in a
rather different way. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, So STAN. L. REV. 2709,
1773-79 (I998) (suggesting that federal courts abstain from deciding some difficult cases involving
assertions of federal rights in order to allow state courts to issue definitive interpretations of state
law that obviate the need for federal constitutional rulings).
393 Cf Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911,
1935-54 (1995) (proposing a federalism-based general prohibition on "regulatory spending" by
Congress).
394 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39S See id. at 862-63 (explaining that changed facts and changed understandings of facts justi-
fied the repudiation of laissez-faire and separate-but-equal constitutionalism).
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D. Legitimacy and the Bully Pulpit
Is increased doctrinal volatility too high a price for the Court to
pay in terms of its own legitimacy? Probably not.396 The legal realist
insight that courts make political decisions has been with us for over a
century without having substantially eroded confidence in courts gen-
erally, or in the Supreme Court specifically. According to one recent
survey, the Court enjoys greater public confidence than Congress or
government in general.397 Moreover, a Court that doggedly adhered to
outdated precedents would also call its legitimacy into question.398
Even if a loosening of the Court's attitude toward precedent were to
result in a small diminution in the Court's legitimacy, such loosening
might have other benefits that would justify the change. 399
To say that the Court's legitimacy could survive a shift towards
provisional adjudication, however, is not to say that provisional adju-
dication would solve the basic difficulty of adapting to rapid change.
Indeed, we might think that provisional adjudication is subject to the
same criticism as the gradualism of the traditional common law
method. 400 Each of the doctrinal changes advocated here - expanded
use of the states as experimental laboratories, percolation, and provi-
sional upholding of laws challenged shortly after their enactment -
would have the effect of delaying the Court's ultimate resolution of le-
gal questions.
The comparison between the gradualism of common law evolution
and the delays accompanying provisional adjudication is somewhat in-
apt. The sorts of delays introduced by such mechanisms as percolation
will typically be measured by months and years, rather than the gen-
erations of delay entailed in common law evolution. Moreover, tradi-
tional common law evolution proceeds by largely unconscious mecha-
nisms, whereas provisional adjudication inquires directly into the real-
world effects of various legal regimes. It seeks workable legal answers
at the retail level, and thus harkens back to an earlier conception of
396 See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV.
379, 408-09 (arguing against a Weberian formal conception of legitimation because the public has
little awareness of legal institutions or legal decisionmaking); Nicholas S. Zeppos, People's Court,
44 VAND. L. REV. 847, 847-48 (1991).
397 See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 754
(I994).
398 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A] decision con-
trary to the public sense of justice as it is, operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect for
the courts and for law itself." (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Peter L. Szanton, Stare Decisis: A Dissenting View, Ito HASTINGS L.J. 394,
397 (1958-59)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
399 See Dorf, supra note i i, at 1772 ("[L]egitimacy should be viewed as a matter of degree: That
one interpretive technique is, in some cases, more legitimate than another does not render the less
legitimate approach illegitimate.").
40 See supra section II.C.
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common law as rooted in the practices of the community401 - except
that given the complexity and dynamism of modern life, provisional
adjudication recognizes that judges will rarely be familiar with the
relevant social practices.
But if provisional adjudication escapes the critique of gradualism,
it may still fall prey to the critique of judicial use of social science.
Provisional adjudication can only be successful to the extent that the
Court understands what lessons to draw from the experience it ob-
serves. Yet this appears to bring us back to the problem with which
we began - the Court's limited ability to evaluate empirical and pre-
dictive claims.
Consider an example. A decade ago, in Morrison v. Olson,402 the
Court upheld severe restrictions on the President's power to remove an
independent counsel because it found that the restrictions were not "of
such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty .... ,"403 This conclusion appeared to be little more
than a guess, given the lack of experience under the statute at the time.
Suppose that the Court were now to regard Morrison as merely
provisional. What lesson should be gleaned from the ferocity of
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation of President
Clinton's efforts to conceal his sexual encounters with a former White
House intern?40 4 Is Starr's zeal attributable to his own peculiar (per-
401 See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 1O3
YALE L.J. i65i, 1655 (1994) ("[In the course of the seventeenth century ... there emerge[d]
among the English common lawyers the strong conviction that the primary source of the validity
of law - including both its moral validity and its political validity - is its historical character, its
source in the customs and traditions of the community whose law it is."); Andrea C. Loux, The
Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in The Nineteenth Cen-
tury, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 183 (1993). By the middle of the nineteenth century, this notion
of common law as the embodiment of the community's practices had largely given way to the
view of common law as the product of judicial reason. See, e.g., Norway Plains Co. v. Boston &
Maine R.R., 67 Mass. (i Gray) 263, 267 (1854) ("IT]he common law consists of a few broad and
comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy,
modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular cases which fall within it."); see
also Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of
Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1394-1417 (2997) (associating the approach of the mid- to late
nineteenth century with natural law).
40' 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
403 Id. at 691.
404 After President Clinton testified before a grand jury investigating allegations that he com-
mitted perjury and obstruction of justice by concealing a sexual relationship with a former White
House intern, his personal lawyer stated: "We're hopeful that the President's testimony will fi-
nally bring closure to the independent counsel's more than four-year and over $40 million investi-
gation, which has culminated in an investigation of the President's private life." John M. Broder,
Testy Finale, Risky Gambit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1998, at Ai. This statement amounted to
wishful thinking. Less than a month later, Starr delivered to the House of Representatives a
sexually explicit report finding ii potential grounds for impeachment, which the House promptly
disseminated to the public at large. See The Starr Report: Full Text of Findings Sent to Congress,
N.Y. TimES, Sept. 12, 2998, at Bi, B9-BIo. As this Foreword goes to print, the House has begun
a formal impeachment inquiry.
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haps politically partisan) desire to drive President Clinton from office?
Alternatively, is the Starr investigation a reflection of the incentives
that any independent counsel faces? According to this latter view, the
independent counsel is a Frankenstein's monster because he acts with-
out the constraint of scarce resources that confronts ordinary prosecu-
tors. 40 5 If the Court were to draw this broader inference, it would be
appropriate to overrule Morrison.
Instead of, or perhaps in addition to, revisiting Morrison, might the
Court appropriately reconsider its recent decision in Clinton v.
Jones,40 6 which held that the Constitution affords the President no
temporary immunity from civil lawsuits for conduct occurring prior to
his Presidency? 407 It was, after all, discovery conducted in Jones that
led to the widening of Starr's investigative authority to include the
President's extramarital sex life. Again, the answer depends on
whether one views the course of events as merely idiosyncratic rather
than as a harbinger of likely litigation against future Presidents. Per-
haps the error in Jones was not the Supreme Court's decision to permit
the case to go forward, but the district court's decision to permit dis-
covery regarding the possibility of completely consensual sex in a case
involving allegations of wholly unrelated sexual harassment.
As the extraordinary events of the past year illustrate, the question
of what lesson experience teaches is only partly an empirical one. It is
often an ideological question as well. Nonetheless, experience matters
even to ideologically laden questions, and it has mattered in the most
important cases of this century. The overruling of Lochner was justi-
fied in part by the experience of the Great Depression,40 and Brown v.
Board of Education40 9 has been most persuasively defended as the
Court's recognition that, as actually practiced, American segregation
was a crucial piece of a system of racial subordination.4 10 If the Court
can learn from experience with respect to such value-laden and con-
tested matters as these, surely the intertwining of fact and value
should not pose an insuperable obstacle to learning from experience in
405 See, e.g., Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM.
CRiM. L. REV. 463, 488-92 (1996) (explaining that the target of an independent counsel's investi-
gation will typically be scrutinized more closely and treated more harshly than the target of an
ordinary prosecutor's investigation).
406 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
407 See id. at 1639.
408 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (I937) (taking judicial notice of the
Great Depression). West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
(1923), and "signaled the demise of Lochner." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861
(1992) (opinion of the Court).
409 347 U.S. 483 0954).
410 See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
429-30 (ig6o) (arguing that Brown was justified because it was widely understood that racial seg-
regation in the American South was an instrument of white supremacy).
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the more mundane and less visible cases that are the Court's bread
and butter.
A move in the direction I advocate would, therefore, hardly elimi-
nate the need for judicial value judgments. Consider the sexual har-
assment cases under Title VII. Five years ago, the Court ruled that
whether sexual harassment is so severe or pervasive as to create a hos-
tile work environment in violation of Title VII "cannot be [measured
by] a mathematically precise test," but depends on "all the circum-
stances."411 The Court stressed that "no single factor is required."412
Although the Court's 1997 Term decisions in Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth4 3 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton41 4 set forth the
conditions under which employers are vicariously liable to one em-
ployee for sexual harassment by another,415 they did not alter this sub-
stantive standard. In effect, the Court's totality-of-the-circumstances
approach to sexual harassment jurisprudence delegates the decision in
many cases to the finder of fact, thereby minimizing the Court's role.
Indeed, even though Burlington Industries and Faragher were widely
praised for establishing "bright line" rules about the scope of employer
liability,4 16 these cases delegate to the factfinder the critical question of
what constitutes "a stated policy suitable to the employment circum-
stances.141 7
I do not mean this observation as a criticism. Such delegations can
be wholly appropriate. Given the variety of workplaces to which Title
VII applies and the likelihood of continued rapid change in the nature
of most employment, more detailed doctrinal rules could lead to
anomalous results in unanticipated circumstances. If the EEOC and
similar state agencies take the lead in disseminating the most success-
ful strategies for preventing and combating sexual harassment, the
ambiguity in the Court's precedents might prove to be their greatest
strength.
411 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (i993). The Court set forth a nonexhaustive list
of relevant factors: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physi-
cally threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; ... whether it unreasonably inter-
feres with an employee's work performance[; and t]he effect on the employee's psychological
well-being...." Id. at 23.
412 Id.
413 i18 S. CL 2257 (x998).
414 118 S. CL 2275 (1998).
415 See Faragher, ii8 S. Ct. at 2292-93; Burlington Indus., ri8 S. Ct. at 2270.
416 See, e.g., Chris Black, Court Sets Sex Harass Guidelines: Employer May Be Liable for Su-
pervisor, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1998, at Ax ("Today the court has set a clear, bright-line
standard for establishing when an employer is or is not responsible for sexual harassment in the
work place." (quoting U.S. Chamber of Commerce General Counsel Stephen A. Bokat)); Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court Weaves Legal Principles From a Tangle of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1998, at A2o ([Tihe rulings [were] praised by women's rights leaders, the Chamber of
Commerce and Federal trial judges alike for providing the first clear set of rules in this rapidly
evolving area of employment law.").
417 Faragher, ri8 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
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But delegation to trial courts or administrative agencies can only go
so far. There is also a place for judicial activism of a certain sort.
When - as in both the desegregation cases of the 195os and i96os 41 8
and the sexual harassment cases of the 199os - the Court's interpreta-
tion of authoritative text calls into question deeply entrenched social
attitudes and practices, the success of the Court's efforts will necessar-
ily depend in part upon its ability to lead. Earlier, I criticized the
Court's textualism in Oncale for failing to provide sufficient guidance
about when sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination. 41 9 Jux-
taposing this failure with the Court's approach in the desegregation
cases, we can see that the problem with the Court's sexual harassment
jurisprudence is not so much its failure to guide, as its failure to in-
spire.
The legal prohibition of sexual harassment is a hot political topic.
Remarkably, in the Court's four sexual harassment rulings during the
1997 Term, no disagreement was expressed about what constitutes
sexual harassment, nor was there any disagreement that the law ap-
propriately treats it as invidious. Yet there is a rhetorical bloodlessness
to the Court's condemnation of sexual harassment. Indeed, the
Court's strongest language appears in the one 1997 Term sexual har-
assment case in which a defendant won, 420 thereby suggesting that the
condemnation was perfunctory.421  Although it would be naive to
think that strong language from the Supreme Court would by itself
bring public attitudes about sexual harassment into line with the law,
it would be equally naive to think that the Court's bully pulpit has no
power to shape social norms. 422
This call for the Court to take moral stands may seem inconsistent
with delaying techniques like percolation and greater emphasis on fac-
418 The Court's approach to desegregation of de jure racially segregated schools also relied
heavily on district courts' application of multifactor balancing tests. See Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 15-16 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 439 (1968).
419 See supra pp. 22-24.
420 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep Sch. Dist., ii8 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 (1998) ("No one questions
that a student suffers extraordinary harm when subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by a
teacher, and that the teacher's conduct is reprehensible and undermines the basic purposes of the
educational system.").
421 Perhaps the justices believed that the facts spoke for themselves in Faragher and Buriington
Industries. Certainly, unadorned detailed description can be moving. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Ab-
bott, i i8 S. Ct. 2 196, 2203-04 (1998) (describing the course of HIV infection and AIDS).
422 The Court appears to recognize as much. In recent memory, divisive social issues such as
abortion and gay rights have provided the occasion for its strongest moral language. See, e.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 623 (1996) ("[The Constitution] neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (i896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)));
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("A State cannot ... deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.");
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5o5 U.S. 833, 85 1 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to de-
fine one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.").
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tual development. We are all familiar with politicians appointing
commissions to conduct further study of an issue in order to postpone
indefinitely any resolution. But the apparent inconsistency dissolves
when we recognize that moral leadership does not invariably entail
centralized decisionmaking. For example, in taking a stand against
the demonization of persons infected with HIV423 or workplace sexual
harassment, the Court signals to the lower courts and the body politic
that they must take these matters seriously, even if the Court recog-
nizes that the particular action appropriate in any given circumstance
cannot be determined by a judicially created, one-size-fits-all legal
rule.
Thus may the Court make a virtue of necessity. Constitutional
lawyers are familiar with what Lawrence Sager calls "underenforced
constitutional norms. '42 4  The Constitution (or a federal statute) may
speak to some question, but the institutional limitations of the judici-
ary nevertheless make a complete judicial solution impossible. Conse-
quently, the courts "underenforce" the legal norm. Yet underenforce-
ment need not equal nonenforcement. As the Court has long
recognized, even when the Court cannot provide a complete remedy,
considerable power flows from its ability to declare what the law is
and when the law has been violated. In Marbury v. Madison,4 25 for
example, Chief Justice Marshall invoked Blackstone's maxim that le-
gal rights require legal remedies while at the same time holding that
the Court was without jurisdiction to grant Marbury a remedy.4 26 Al-
though Marshall's goal may have been simply to embarrass his Re-
publican nemeses, his technique has much broader applicability. Es-
pecially in an age when the judiciary is painfully aware of its own
limitations,427 the articulation of fundamental (albeit corrigible) values
may be its central task.4 28
423 See Bragdon, iIg S. Ct. at 2213 (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
424 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 123 (1978); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Justice in Plain
Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nv. U. L. RaV. 420, 420-28 (1993)
(proposing that constitutional adjudication should allow popular politics to solve "complex ques-
tions of social strategy and social responsibility").
425 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
426 See id. at 163, 176-77.
427 See Victoria F. Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 1401, 1403-05 (I997) (arguing that the basic structure of modern constitutional doctrine re-
flects judicial self doubt).
428 After all, it is one thing to admit that the complete resolution of a pressing social problem is
beyond the judiciary's capacity; it is quite another to deny the problem's existence. See Laurence
H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics,
103 HARV. L. REV. I, 33-34 (1989) ('To announce that government bears no responsibility for
[race discrimination in capital sentencing and related] problems is to legitimate government's ac-
tions, and to relieve both governmental and nongovernmental actors of responsibility for solving
these problems in institutionally appropriate ways." (emphasis omitted)).
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IB CONCLUSION
Despite occasional battles between textualism and purposivism in
statutory and constitutional interpretation, the common law method of
case-by-case elaboration of legal principles appears to be the dominant
interpretive methodology of the Supreme Court. This Foreword has
noted the affinities between the common law method and the Socratic
method, and has expressed concern regarding the Court's unconscious
emulation of long-dead Greek philosophers in over-emphasizing con-
templation at the expense of systematic observation. It has suggested
correctives in the form of doctrines and practices that would enable
the Court to benefit from experimentation under conflicting regimes,
while recognizing that limitations inherent in the Court's institutional
posture constrain its ability to assess the outcome of such experiments.
In addition to the limits just identified, one might add a seemingly
more serious objection. Figuring out what "works" in practice only
makes sense if one has a normative framework for measuring suc-
cess.42 9 Jim Crow worked reasonably well as a system of social con-
trol,430 but disastrously as measured by a norm of equal human dig-
nity.
We may, however, concede - indeed insist upon - the necessity of
normative reasoning without denying the relevance of experience. Ex-
perience is obviously relevant instrumentally in numerous ways: if. for
example, the Court believes that government-sponsored race based af-
firmative action is only permissible when race neutral means fail to
achieve an otherwise compelling objective, it will be useful to know
how effective race neutral means are in achieving such objectives.
Yet implicit in this Foreword has been a stronger claim about the
value of experience that can be broadly associated with American
pragmatism.4 3 1 The claim is not only that individual and societal ex-
perience is relevant in measuring institutions and practices against pre-
429 See Dworkin, supra note 15o, at 1735; Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 353, 366-67 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia,
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1265-67 (1997).
430 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J.
624, 627 ("According to the prevailing social science of the 19IOS and Ig2os, the social value cre-
ated by a comprehensive, state-enforced plan of racial separation was far greater than any costs
imposed on its victims.").
431 The leading pragmatists were Dewey, James, and Pierce. See JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE
THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938); WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD
WAYS OF THINKING (907); Charles S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, reprinted in PRAG-
MATISM: A READER 26 (Louis Menand ed., 1997). Two leading neo-pragmatists are Bernstein
and Rorty. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERIMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); RICHARD RORTY, CGNSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM
(1982). For an insightful discussion of the odd road from early to late twentieth century philo-
sophical pragmatism, see Louis Menand, An Introduction to Pragmatism, in PRAGMATISM: A
READER, supra, at xi, xxxi-xxxiv. For a concise history of pragmatism generally, see id. at xi-
Xxxiv.
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determined normative structures, but also that such experience plays a
critical role in the (re-)formulation of these normative structures.43 2
Criticism of pragmatism as insufficiently normative mistakes pragma-
tism for amoral instrumentalism. 433  Pragmatism's insistence upon the
priority of experience over theory, of doing over philosophizing, does
not require the abandonment of concerns for justice, or more generally,
of normativity.4 34
Will the Court be receptive to the modest reform agenda I have
proposed here? In some ways it seems an obvious fit, at least for the
Court's legal process majority. In addition to endorsing (a textually
constrained) purposivism in statutory interpretation, the legal process
school emphasized judicial consideration of the allocation of authority
based upon relative institutional competence.4 35  By permitting social
and political actors other than the Court to take leading roles in ad-
dressing novel situations, provisional adjudication complements the
432 Hence, the Court's treatment of normative and empirical questions as intertwined is only
sometimes a result of confusion. But cf. Faigman, supra note 3x5, at 572 ("Interpretive facts are
permeated with values only because the Court does not expend sufficient energy separating one
from the other.").
433 No doubt Holmes, who played the leading role in introducing pragmatism into the law,
bears substantial responsibility for the association of pragmatism with instrumentalism. See
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 788-89 (x989); Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative Jurisprudence, So-
ciolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 315-16 (1996); see also
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 1o CORNELL L.Q. I7, 26 (1925) (stating that judicial deci-
sionmaking should be considered "relative to consequences" (emphasis omitted)). Pragmatism's
contemporary champions also contribute to the confusion. For example, in the case of abortion,
Judge Posner writes: "[P]ragmatism, at least my sort of pragmatism, recognizes that ... moral
disagreement is insoluble and wishes to use this recognition as the starting point when deciding
what abortion rights, if any, to recognize." Posner, Reply to Critics, supra note i8o, at 1799. My
sort of pragmatism, however, always leaves open the possibility that experience and interaction
will dissolve what looked like intractable disagreement over first principles. For a discussion of
Judge Posner's ambivalent relationship to pragmatism, see Clark Freshman, Were Patricia Wil-
liams and Ronald Dworkin Separated at Birth?, 95 COLum. L. REv. 1568 (1995) (reviewing
RIcHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (I995)).
434 Louis Menand writes:
It is sometimes complained that pragmatism is a bootstrap theory - that it cannot tell us
where we should want to go or how we can get there. The answer to this is that theory
can never tell us where to go; only we can tell us where to go. Theories are just one of the
ways we make sense of our needs. We wake up one morning and find ourselves in a new
place, and then we build a ladder to explain how we got there. The pragmatist is the per-
son who asks whether this is a good place to be. The nonpragmatist is the person who
admires the ladder.
Menand, supra note 433, at xxxiv; see also RORTY, supra note r74, at ii (arguing in favor of "a
pragmatist conception of knowledge [that] eliminates the Greek contrast between contemplation
and action").
435 See, e.g., Peller, supra note 63, at 594 ("The process-theorists imagined that there could be a
kind of natural, functional correlation between different kinds of disputes and different kinds of
institutions .... "); Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1573
(1996) ("The first theme [of The Legal Process] emphasizes that legal process theory grapples with
institutional competence.").
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principles of deference that form the backdrop to most of the Court's
work.
4 3 6
However, in challenging the Court's Platonic reliance on introspec-
tion, this Foreword appears to conflict with another crucial pillar of
the legal process school, namely, the belief that the courts can engage
in - indeed enjoy an institutional advantage when engaging in -
reasoned elaboration. 437  Legal process theorists held the "belief that
those who respect and exercise the faculty of reason will be rewarded
with the discovery of a priori criteria that give[] sense and legitimacy
to their legal activities. '438  If understood as pure Platonic philoso-
phizing, reasoned elaboration seems inconsistent with the spirit of this
Foreword. Yet it would be a gross mischaracterization of the legal
process method to associate it with philosophical speculation divorced
from reality.439 Legal process theorists insisted upon situating legal
questions in their real-world context, an attitude that seems to be
shared by the purposivist majority of the Court. Accordingly, it is at
least plausible to argue that as an alternative to the skepticism of legal
realism, legal process theory offered not the idealism of Plato but the
pragmatism of Dewey.440 Reinterpreted within the pragmatist tradi-
tion, the legal process theory endorsed by the majority of the Justices
ought to be hospitable to provisional adjudication. 44 1
The Court's legal process majority should also be hospitable to a
call for it to infuse its work with broad statements of moral principle.
Although the current Justices were taught by Hart, Sacks, and Wech-
sler, they are of a different generation. Whereas their teachers' views
were shaped in response to Erie and the overruling of Lochner, for the
current Justices, "the central, intellectually formative case" was Brown
v. Board of Education.442 Thus, they understand that they must some-
436 See supra pp. 47-50.
437 See HART & SACKS, supra note (3, at 143-58; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims
may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.").
438 Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason- The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, i5
CARDOZO L. REV. 6Ol, 605 (1993); see also DUXBURY, supra note 159, at 5 ("The central message
of the process tradition in American jurisprudence is that judges ought to place their faith not in
politics but in reason .... "). Anthony Sebok identifies the three conventional pillars of legal pro-
cess thought as: allocation of authority to the institution with greatest competence; purposivism in
statutory interpretation; and the belief in reasoned elaboration. See Sebok, supra note 435, at
1573-75. He then offers a counter-interpretation. See id. at 1575.
439 See Laura Kalman, Eating Spaghetti with a Spoon, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1562-63 (i997)
(reviewing DUXBURY, supra note 159).
440 See Sebok, supra note 435, at 1574 & n.iI (citing Peller, supra note 63, at 583-84 (citing
JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939))).
441 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 284-86.
442 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV.
953, 959 (I994); see also DUXBURY, supra note 159, at 266 (observing that Hart and Sacks did not
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times provide principled moral leadership, even if, as the 1997 Term
illustrates, they find that their docket affords them few opportunities
to do so.
even mention Brown); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 3o-36
(1996) (describing legal process theorists' efforts to account for Brown).
